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The Supreme Court in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.'
invalidated a municipal minority business set-aside program on equal
protection grounds, casting into doubt the legal status of all set-asides.
2
For the first time a majority of the Court applied strict scrutiny to a
legislative racial classification which benefited rather than burdened
historically disadvantaged minorities. The Court's ruling barely
acknowledged3 the existence of ongoing discrimination against minor-
ity-owned firms.4 The Court premised its decision on the fundamentally
flawed assumption that "[s]tates and their local subdivisions have many
legislative weapons at their disposal both to punish and prevent present
discrimination .... -5 This article begins by examining this critical
assumption by the Court. Part I identifies the glaring inadequacies of
existing legal remedies for discrimination in private business dealings.
Part II demonstrates the insurmountable difficulties involved in draft-
ing effective legislation to prohibit discrimination in private business
transactions.
Part III argues that these problems, chiefly arising from the dif-
ficulty of showing that the discrimination was intentional, justify greater
flexibility in judicial review of state and local government procurement
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; B.A. 1968,
University of Michigan; J.D. 1973, Harvard Law School. For their insightful comments on a
draft version of this article, I wish to thank my former colleagues at Arizona State University,
Professors Calleros, Leshy, Spritzer, and Weinstein, as well as Professors Taunya Banks and
W.H. Knight.
1. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
2. Id. at 493-98, 511.
3. Id. at 479-80, 494, 508-11, 533 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4. See Suggs, Rethinking Minority Business Development Strategies, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rnv. 101, 109-12, 115-16 (1990) (discussing the difficulty of documenting present discrimi-
nation). Aggregate data has been used to infer discrimination in access to financial capital. See
Bates, The Changing Nature of Minority Business: A Comparative Analysis of Asian, Nonmi-
nority, and Black-Owned Businesses, 18 REv. BLAcK POL. ECON. 25, 37 (1989) ("[B]Ilacks get
smaller loans than nonminorities who possess otherwise identical education, age, and equity
capital traits.").
5. Croson, 488 U.S. at 494.
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set-asides, which require prime contractors to subcontract a specified
percentage of their government contracts to eligible minority owned
subcontractors. 6 A more flexible approach is necessary because the same
obstacles that impede effective legal redress in individual actions for
intentional discrimination in private commercial transactions also thwart
the ability of jurisdictions to satisfy Croson's required justifications for
set-asides, precise factual showings of prior unlawful intentional dis-
crimination.
7
If the Court continues to ignore these problems and if minority
business enterprises (MBEs) simply must accept the market barrier and
handicap that race creates, then the equity of Croson rests on whether
whites would be prepared to accept analogous handicaps. The true test
of the integrity of the doctrine established in Croson then becomes
whether the policy handicaps the doctrine requires would be accepted
if the shoe were on the other foot.'
If nebulous and subtle forms of discrimination excluded whites
from major markets, would a set-aside be rejected unless the strict terms
of Croson were met? Would a concern that "[c]lassifications based on
race . . . may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to
a politics of racial hostility" 9 compel the national government to sub-
ordinate the economic well-being of the white business community to
these overriding principles?
6. The recent five to four decision by the Supreme Court in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990), displayed a welcome sense of reality. In upholding a congres-
sionally mandated minority preference in the federally regulated transfer of broadcast licenses,
the Court deferred to Congress, its co-equal branch, and did not apply a strict scrutiny analysis.
Id. at 3008-09. The Court drew a sharp distinction between the use of remedial racial
classifications by the federal government and their use by subordinate governmental entities.
Id. at 3009. There is, however, some uncertainty as to the continued viability of the Court's
approach in Metro Broadcasting. Justice Brennan, the author of the majority opinion, recently
has retired from the Court, and the dissent unanimously applied a strict scrutiny test for federal
set-asides. Id. at 3044. Since the Court predicated the legality of the set-aside on the important
governmental objective of achieving broadcasting diversity, id. at 3010, the Metro holding may
well be limited to cases involving first amendment considerations if Justice Brennan's replace-
ment, Justice Souter, joins the dissenters when the Court inevitably revisits the issue.
7. For a discussion of the difficulty of showing individual instances of intentional
discrimination, see infra text accompanying notes 95-111, and 122-160. For a discussion of the
use of aggregate statistics to show intentional discrimination, see infra notes 257-281 and
accompanying text.
8. "In order to detect means discrimination, it is necessary to ask whether the same
decision would have been made if its racial impact had been reversed .... Schnapper, Two
Categories of Discriminatory Intent, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 31, 51 (1982); see also
Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Cm. L. Rav. 935, 956-59
(1989) (articulating the "reversing the groups" test).
9. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
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Such a parallel situation exists. Part IV compares the complaints
of minority firms claiming discrimination in domestic markets to those
of American firms claiming exclusion from Japanese markets.'0 Like
many minority firms in the domestic context, many American firms
have had difficulty identifying and documenting convincing instances
of intentional discriminatory treatment by potential Japanese custom-
ers in specific transactions." Despite this inability to satisfy the Croson
standards, (and despite elimination of formal trade barriers analogous
to de jure discrimination), portions of the United States government
and the American business community have demanded a specified share
(in substance a set-aside) of various Japanese markets under the rubric
of "managed trade.'
2
The Court's concern in Croson that awarding contracts based upon
race 3 can "promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics
of racial hostility"' 4 seems especially applicable to the U.S.-Japanese
trade context, given the racist strands in both cultures and the legacy
of the 1941-1945 Pacific War. 5 American policy makers in interna-
tional trade, however, think of "managed trade" as a remedy for the
closed nature of the Japanese economy,' 6 not in terms of promoting
their own racial inferiority.' 7 The failure to conceive of "managed trade"
in terms of confirming American "racial" inferiority derives perhaps
from the different perspective from which the administration views the
issue. The Croson Court viewed the minority set-aside from the view-
10. I would like to thank Professor John P. Morris of Arizona State University College
of Law for the genesis of this parallel.
11. See infra Part IV.A.
12. Advocates of "managed trade" argue that, after many years of failure, it is fruitless
to seek to open Japanese markets by dismantling formal governmental and structural trade
impediments. Instead, they urge that the only way to surmount Japanese nontariff trade barriers
is to extract firm guarantees from Japan that assure American firms a specified share of
Japanese markets. See infra text accompanying note 308.
13. Whether this classification is based upon race or nationality is immaterial for purposes
of this analysis, especially since both are social constructs. In this instance nationality can also
serve as a proxy for race.
14. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). Racial hostilities
between Japan and the United States may also have domestic "scapegoating" or retaliatory
ramifications for Asian Americans. This risk directly implicates the Croson rationale.
15. See Fallows, Containing Japan, ATA4Nmc Mosnmy, May 1989 at 40, 48; Ito, Trans-
Pacific Anger, 78 FoREIGN POL'Y 131 (1990); Morita & Ishihara, The Japan That Can Say No,
reprinted in 135 Cong. Rec. E3783-98 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1989) (introduced by Rep. Levin);
Spencer, Japan as Competitor, 78 FOREIGN POL'Y 153 (1990); see also infra text accompanying
notes 330-334.
16. 'Revisionist' Influence Seen in Japan Talks, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1989, at C2, col. 1.
17. Atjeast some Japanese also might feel this way. See Ito, supra note 15; Spencer, supra
note 15.
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point of the "perpetrator" of the acts that the set-aside was intended
to remedy. It considered whether a set-aside confirms racial inferiority
in the minds of nonminorities rather than minorities. In contrast, ad-
vocates of "managed trade" view this policy from the "victim" per-
spective. From the victim's viewpoint, mandating a specified market
share solves the problem of a persistent wrongdoer who cannot be
trusted to comply with neutral prohibitions. 8 This shift in perspective
may account for the failure of proponents of "managed trade" in the
Administration to recognize that their position is inconsistent with Cro-
son's policies.
A. Historical Background
While the legal system has done little to prevent business discrim-
ination, it has played a major role in producing the current paucity
of minority business activity. Several centuries of race conscious pol-
icies were designed to produce this result. 19 Before the Civil War, laws
of both general and specific application restricted the ability of blacks,
2
0
whether North or South, slave or free, to engage in commercial ac-
tivity. The pervasive legal presumption that a black or mulatto was a
18. See generally Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MuNN. L. REv. 1049 (1978) (examining
antidiscrimination laws from a victim's perspective).
19. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AmmICAN LAW 589-632 (2d ed. 1980) (examining the
role of race in American law); I. BERLIN, SLAvEs Wrmoutr MASTERs: Tn FREE NEGRO IN rn
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 316-40 (1974) (describing laws that discriminated against blacks in the early
19th century); L. GREENE, Tan NEGRO iN CooiAL NEW ENGLAND 298-315 (1968) (describing
political, economic, and social barriers imposed on free blacks in New England during the 18th
century); A. HiGGINqoTHAIm, IN TH MATTER OF COLOR (1978) (chronicling various state legal
and economic barriers faced by slaves); L. LrrwACK, NORTH OF SLAvERY 153-86 (1961) (describing
how discriminatory laws and attitudes kept blacks of the North out of commerce, the professions,
and skilled occupations); E. McMANus, BLACK BONDAGE IN THE NORTH 172-77 (1973) (explaining
how post emancipation laws perpetuated the white hegemony); C. WOODWARD, Tan STRANGE
CAREER OF Jim CROW (2d ed. 1966) (detailing segregation known as the Jim Crow system);
Coles, The Unique Problems of the Black Businessman, 26 VAN]). L. REv. 509 (1973) (describing
several 18th century laws preventing slaves from carrying on businesses).
20. I have chosen the term "black" to describe Americans of African descent. "Black"
as a positive term has a popular history dating only from the 1960s and the advent of the
"Black Power" phase of the civil rights movement. It was adopted as a term of self-
identification, much as the term "African American" is being adopted now. While it may seem
archaic to continue to use it, there are more important issues confronting black Americans than
the latest trends in terminology. I use "black" as a correlative to "white." Neither indicates
geographic origin. If I had my druthers, I would reserve use of the term "African American"
for contemporary immigrants from that continent who trace their origins to particular countries,
such as Nigeria or Ethiopia, and use the term "Afro-American" for those of African descent
who cannot trace their origins to a particular place and lack linguistic and cultural ties to a
specific state or region.
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slave unless proven otherwise and the inability of blacks to testify against
whites in court or plead self-defense, even against a malicious attack
from a white, made legal action or self-help in support of commercial
transactions risky or practically impossible.
2'
In addition, specific enactments inhibited efforts by some mi-
norities to acquire property. "Discrimination ... [in colonial New
England] reached its zenith in Connecticut, where legislative action
prompted by citizens of New London threatened to make it impossible
for free Negroes either to purchase property or to reside in the col-
ony." 22 In colonial Massachusetts, "[b]lacks, Indians, and mulattoes
in Boston were ... forbidden to keep hogs because such an activity
allegedly tempted them to steal from their masters .... 2,1 In the an-
tebellum South, the Slave Codes barred slaves from buying or selling
goods.24 Northern states by law prevented free blacks from purchasing
public lands.2S Virginia prohibited slaves from owning cattle, 26 and
barred most free blacks from being licensed as shopkeepers, 27 while in
South Carolina slaves could not deal in rice or coin. 2S In 1805 Maryland
enacted a statute barring blacks from selling wheat, corn, or tobacco,
the major cash crops of the time, without a state license.29 Ohio went
even further in 1807, requiring every black to register and post a bond
in the sum of $500, a considerable sum in that era.30
After the Civil War the discretionary power of government of-
ficials to grant or deny licenses necessary to conduct a business was
used to discriminate against minorities. In San Francisco a municipal
board of control discriminated against the Chinese by refusing to issue
them permits to conduct laundry businesses while granting permits to
similarly situated whites.31 In the South, Jim Crow legislation circum-
21. E. GmEov-sE, RoLL, JoPDAN, RoLL: THE Wo.L THE SLAVES MADE 32, 401, 402 (1974).
White hostility and prejudice also circumscribed commercial activity. In New York "[t]he
prejudices of white labor and the fear of violence [against blacks] caused New York City
authorities to refuse licenses to Negro carmen and porters." L. LrrWACK, supra note 19, at
159.
22. L. GREENE, supra note 19, at 312.
23. A. H-rooIomTHAm, supra note 19, at 79.
24. J. FRANKLIN, FRoM SLAVERY TO FR oM 135 (5th ed. 1980).
25. Marable, The Racial Contours of the Constitution, 30 How. L.J. 953, 963 (1987).
26. A. HIOanmOTHAm, supra note 19, at 56.
27. The few blacks who were licensed as shopkeepers were subject to harassment. I. BERLIN,
supra note 19, at 242-43 (shopkeepers frequently were dragged into court for violating the city
code in the hopes that they eventually would give up and not reopen their shops).
28. A. HIOGnmoTHAm, supra note 19, at 199.
29. Marable, supra note 25, at 963 (citing H. AxTHrmm, A DocumswARY HIsToRY oF
THE NEGRO PEoPLE IN THE UNITED STATES, FROM COLONIAL TIMES THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR
209-10 (1951)).
30. Id.
31. C. MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF TE NEoRo 69 (1970). The Supreme Court
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scribed the general social and legal rights of blacks. While Jim Crow
legislation did not directly regulate black business activity, its practical
effect was to limit black businesses to segregated markets that whites
refused to serve.
32
Perhaps the absence of Jim Crow business legislation explains the
failure, during the heyday of the civil rights era, to address problems
of continuing racial barriers to business activity. There were no statutes
to overturn, no egregious enactments whose immorality was clear. In-
stead, there existed only customs and practices quietly carried out within
the zones of private and personal associations in which courts have
refused to intrude.
Much like the barriers confronting American firms in Japan, the
customs and practices hindering minority businesses are elusive, sit-
uational, and a matter of interpersonal relationships. Their effect, how-
ever, is far from insubstantial. Traditionally, law has not interceded
in these arenas. Forms of associational discrimination that limit busi-
ness opportunities have been challenged only recently.33
B. An Unacknowledged History of Racial Discrimination in Business
Transactions
In striking down a minority business set-aside, the Supreme Court
in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 34 virtually eliminated one of
the few programs that effectively breached racial barriers for minority
businesses. In doing so, the Court acted without any expressed aware-
ness of the vulnerability of minority business to discrimination. More-
over, Croson reflects the Court's serious misconceptions about the legal
scope and practical effect of prohibitions against discrimination even
in the area of federal procurement.35
invalidated this ordinance in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885). The situation that the
Supreme Court confronted in Yick Wo still occurs, although rarely so blatantly. Without such
clear racist motives behind state or local licensing schemes, correction by litigation is difficult.
As a result, few such cases are ever filed. But see Isaac Manego v. Cape Cod Five Cents Say.
Bank, 692 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1982) (plaintiff MBE challenged on antitrust grounds the denial
of entertainment and liquor licenses, alleging in substance that racial discrimination was
anticompetitive), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986).
32. L. LITWACK, supra, note 19, at 178-80 (In the few instances where blacks were allowed
to serve a white clientele they were required to bar members of their own race from their
services); R. SuGos, REcENr CHANGES iN BLACK-OWNED BUsnEass, Joint Center for Political
Studies 25-26 (1986) [hereinafter R. SuGos, RECENT CHANGES].
33. See e.g., New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (holding
that a purportedly private male club used for business purposes was not sufficiently private to
be permitted to discriminate based on sex).
34. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
35. See infra note 65 and accompanying text (concerning the Supreme Court's assumptions
in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) regarding the impact of Title VI on federal
procurement).
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Despite Croson's facile assumption about the existence of laws
barring discrimination in business transactions, 6 no federal statute ever
has been adopted specifically to bar racial discrimination in private
commercial transactions between two business firms) 7 This glaring
omission has had serious implications for minority business develop-
ment and the ability of minorities to advance economically. Little at-
tention has been devoted to discrimination against minority owned
business firms. Legislation and programs have been enacted to foster
minority business development, but their principal thrust has been to
overcome the continuing effects of earlier discrimination, not to forbid
current discrimination.
Discrimination in the business context has been treated largely as
a phenomenon of the past.38 While some black Americans undoubtedly
have made economic progress, 39 the relative level of black incomes has
seen little change. For decades incomes of blacks have been about three-
fifths of white incomes.40 The disparity in business activity is even more
36. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
37. This sweeping statement must be limited to the domestic context. The Export Admin-
istration Act Amendments, 50 U.S.C.A. § 2407(a)(1)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1990) (principally
directed at the Arab boycott of Israel), bar discrimination by one United States business against
another based on the race, religion, sex, or national origin of the owners of that business, when
the discrimination is intended to further an unsanctioned foreign boycott. See 15 C.F.R. §
769.2(b)(1)(ii), example (vii) (1990).
38. In the entire discussion of discrimination in the Fullilove majority opinion, not a single
unambiguous reference was made to current discrimination. Instead the Court focused on the
continuing effects of prior discrimination. See Fuilove, 448 U.S. at 485-90.
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) the Court noted that "Congress
found that 'the effects of past inequities stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination have
resulted in a severe underrepresentation of minorities in the media of mass communications."'
Id. at 3009-10 (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADnm,. NEws 2261, 2287).
Congress and the Commission do not justify the minority ownership policies strictly
as remedies for victims of this discrimination, however. Rather, Congress and the
FCC have selected the minority ownership policies primarily to promote programming
diversity, and they urge that such diversity is an important governmental objective
that can serve as a constitutional basis for the preference policies. We agree.
Id. at 3010.
39. Since blacks are the largest minority group in the United States and there are more
data available on blacks over a longer time period than on other minorities, this Article will
refer generally to data on the status of blacks rather than of minorities as a whole.
40. Between 1970 and 1983 the ratio of black incomes to white incomes actually fell from
61.3% to 56.3%. BUREAU OF TE CESUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, Series P-60, No. 145, MoEY INco E AND PovERTY STATUS OF FAMIMS AND PERSONS
iN Tm UNrnED STATES: 1983, Table 3 (1984). The original framers of the Constitution no doubt
would find this appropriate. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 2 (deeming non-freed persons as three-
fifths of a free person).
Some Asian American minorities have income levels above those of any white ancestry
group. Hispanics as a whole tend to fall between blacks and whites, although Hispanic subgroups
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pronounced. 4' The black business participation rate is only about one-
quarter of the national average.42 While blacks make up twelve percent
of the population, they own only two percent of all business firms. 43
In 1982, only sixteen dollars of every $10,000 in business receipts, less
than two-tenths of one percent, came from black-owned firms. 44 Black
business receipts would have to increase seventy-five-fold before they
would be proportionate to the black share of the total population. 45
Perhaps present discrimination against minority businesses explains the
persistence of some of this disparity.
I. Remedies For Business Discrimination
The Supreme Court has assumed that effective legislative weapons
are available to punish and prevent business discrimination. 46 The va-
(e.g. Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans, Cuban Americans) range from below blacks to the
bottom of the lowest white groups. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS
OF POPULATION, GENERAL SOCIAL AND EcoNoMIc CHARACTERISTICS, U.S. SuMMARY, Tables 164,
170 PC 80-1-Cl (1983).
41. Other minorities also are underrepresented in business activity. The two other minority
groups included in the business census, (1) Hispanics and (2) Asian, Indian, and Other, are
each significantly smaller in total population than blacks and have fewer absolute numbers of
business firms. Businesses owned by each of these groups, however, in the aggregate employ
more paid employees and have greater aggregate firm receipts than do black-owned firms. In
1982 black-owned firms accounted for about 40%o of all minority owned firms and for less
than 30%o of all minority business revenues. Minority business revenues accounted for less than
one percent of total business revenues. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1982 SURvEy OF MiNoRrry-
OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, MB82-1, Table I, MB82-2, Table I, MB82-3, Table 1 (1985,
1986, 1986) [hereinafter 1982 MBE CENSUS].
42. F. FRATOE & R. MEEKS, BusHEss PARTICIPATION RATES OF TIE 50 LARGEST U.S.
ANCESTRY GROUPS: A PRELMINARY REPORT; Research Div., Office of Advocacy, Research &
Information, Minority Business Dev. Agency, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, June 1985.
43. R. SuGos, RECENT CHANGES, supra note 32, at 3.
44. Id. at 2, 6.
45. The increase needed if all minority business receipts are to be proportionate to
population is somewhat less, about 29-fold. This figure is derived from Appendix III in R.
SUGGs, RECENT CHANGES supra note 32, and 1982 MBE CENSUS, supra note 41. It does not
reflect the summary data that eliminates the double counting of some Hispanics. This figure
compares small, usually closely held firms to a group that includes "Fortune 500 corporations."
It also ignores the beneficial interest of blacks in pension funds that own shares in publicly
traded firms. No Fortune 500 firm has evolved from a black-owned firm nor has any Fortune
500 firm ever been led by a black, and individual share ownership by blacks is extremely small.
See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-70, No. 7, HOUSE-
HOLD WEALTH AND ASSET OWNERSHIP: 1984, 5, 8 (1986). If only partnership revenues are
considered, which eliminates major publicly held firms as well as sole proprietorships (few of
which are more than part-time, incidental endeavors), then in 1982 black partnership revenues
would have had to increase by a factor of 27 to be proportionate to the black population.
Derived from R. SUGos, RECENT CHANGES, supra note 32, at apps. II & III.
46. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989).
1264 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN BUSINESS
lidity of this assumption may be tested by examining existing statutes
and reported cases. Based on Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes,47
legal theories can be constructed that would reach discrimination in a
private business transaction.4 A small number of decisions recognize
causes of action based upon such theories 4 9 but ultimate success on
the merits has yet to be achieved in a reported opinion.
The reported cases disclose only a single instance in which a claim
of racial discrimination in public sector procurement5 has produced
a damage award for a minority firm.5 1 Such a claim is clearly cog-
nizable under current constitutional doctrine.5 2 Since there are abun-
dant findings of discrimination in school,5 3 housing 5 4 employment 55
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) (providing for equal rights to make and enforce contracts;
originally enacted in 1870).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 155-160 (discussing § 1981 claims in private business
transactions).
49. See infra note 156.
50. The distinction concerned here is not between "state action" and private action, but
rather between public sector procurement procedures, which require acceptance of the lowest
bid and thus, theoretically, provide an objective basis to determine intentional discrimination,
and private bidding transactions in which no such obligation exists.
51. See Brant Constr. Co. v. Lumen Constr. Co. Inc., 515 N.E.2d 868 (Ind. App. 1987).
In Brant, a prime contractor was held liable under,42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 for $232,996.60
in damages, $155,132 in attorney's fees and $20,258.57 in expenses and expert witness fees. The
plaintiff, an Hispanic-owned firm, claimed that after it had received a subcontract under a set-
aside, the defendant prime contractor interfered with its performance in violation of the civil
rights laws.
The holding of Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), that § 1981
coverage does not extend beyond the formation stage of a contract, substantially vitiates the
Brant holding unless the Brant result can be predicated on § 1983 alone, and if the scope of §
1983 is not limited by Patterson. See also T & S Serv. Assoc. Inc. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d 722,
728 (Ist Cir. 1981). In T & S the trial court awarded $22,787 in compensatory damages for
racial discrimination that violated § 1981 in the award of a public school lunch contract. The
court of appeals reversed on the ground that the trial court erroneously had imposed the burden
of persuasion on the defendant on the issue of whether it had articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the plaintiff's bid. See infra Part II.B.(1) (discussing T
& S and public procurement generally).
52. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution bars direct racial discrimination
by the federal government, and the fourteenth amendment bars discrimination by states and
subordinate governmental entities.
53. Findings continue to be made even against school districts. See e.g., United States v.
Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
54. The most recent national study of housing discrimination, conducted in 1977 in 40
metropolitan areas, found that if a black visited four rental agents, at least one instance of
racial discrimination would occur 72% of the time. If a black visited four sales agents, at least
one instance of discrimination would occur 48% of the time. R. WIENK, C. REI, J. SIMONSON
& F. Eamas, MEASURNG RACIAL DISCRIMDNATION IN AMEIucAN HousING MARxKrS: TIM HOUSING
MARKET PRAcnCEs SURVEY ES-l-ES-2 (U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev.) (1979).
55. See generally A COMMON DEsTnY, BLAcKs A AAMmRicAN Socm" (G. Jaynes & R.
Williams eds. 1989) [hereinafter A COMMON DEsrINY]. In 1985 the estimated lifetime earnings
of white male college graduates was $1.42 million, $450,000 more than black male college
graduates. Id. at 301.
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voting,5 6 and other contexts, it is unlikely that our business community
has achieved the equity and harmony that has evaded the rest of so-
ciety.57 This stunning absence of success clearly indicates a lack of vi-
able enforcement tools.
Discrimination against minority owned business firms can occur
in three basic situations: (1) when the government discriminates in its
choice of a prime contractor; 8 (2) when a government employed prime
contractor discriminates in its choice of a subcontractor; 9 and (3) when
a private firm discriminates in its selection of a supplier in a transaction
not involving public funds.
MBEs have based claims of business discrimination 6 on federal
constitutional and statutory grounds, and on state third party bene-
56. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.ll (1986); see also MINoR=r- VoTE
DILUTION (C. Davidson ed. 1984) (detailing the vote dilution mechanisms that make the votes
of minority group members less effective than those of whites); A CoMMi~oN DEasTNY, supra
note 55.
57. Negative stereotyping of blacks still remains a significant feature of black-white rela-
tions. See H. ScHMmAN, C. STEEH & L. BOBO, RACIAL AIrrrUDEs IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND
INTERPRETATIONS (1985); A COMMON DESTnY, supra note 55; see also Kluegel & Smith, Whites'
Beliefs About Blacks' Opportunity, 47 Am. Soc. REv. 518 (1982) (examining whites' perceptions
of discrimination and reverse discrimination. In each of the age groups surveyed (18-29, 30-39,
40-49, 50-59, and 60 plus), a significant number of subjects admitted to racist attitudes.
Percentages of each age group, ranging from 17.6% to 51.3%, favored laws against interracial
marriage; 24.5% to 45.8% felt that whites have a right to racial segregation in housing; 16.9%
to 36.2% would object to a family member bringing a black friend home. Id. at 522, table 3.
58. There are also cases in which MBEs challenge as discriminatory a government's denial
of a license that is either necessary or desirable for a business. See, e.g., Isaac Manego v. Cape
Cod Five Cent Say. Bank, 692 F.2d 174 (Ist Cir. 1982) (plaintiff sued based on denial of a
liquor license). While such actions undermine business activity, a detailed discussion of their
impact on MBEs is beyond the scope of this Article. See supra note 31.
59. Most government contracts, as part of their boiler plate agreements, impose an
obligation on both prime contractors and subcontractors not to discriminate in employment.
See, e.g., Federal Highway Admin., Dep't of Transp., 23 C.F.R. § 172.9(a) (1989) ("All
contracts awarded by grantees, subgrantees, and the contractors shall contain provisions requiring
compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended."); see also Exec. Order
No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 567 (1965-65) (mandating nondiscrimination in employment by government
contractors and subcontractors). Even if such an obligation not to discriminate were extended
to the choice of a subcontractor by the prime contractor, however, it is unclear whether a
minority-owned firm can enforce such a provision, or whether only the government imposing
the nondiscrimination obligation on the prime contractor can enforce it. The result may well
turn on whether the entire MBE provision can be held to create a private right of action (see
infra text accompanying notes 232-246) or to create a third party beneficiary contract fight of
action (see infra text accompanying notes 209-212). A number of courts have held that a
government's failure to impose sanctions for violation of a contract's antidiscrimination provision
is not state action for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. See Cox v. Athena Cablevision,
558 F. Supp. 258, 259-60 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, 453 F.
Supp. 735, 738 (E.D. Pa. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 676 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1982);
Technicable Video Sys. v. Americable, 479 So. 2d 810, 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
60. Most reported cases appear as decisions on preliminary motions, so it would be
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ficiary contract theories. 61 A typical suit alleges claims based upon sev-
eral constitutional provisions as well as on all the Reconstruction Era
civil rights statutes. 62 The courts' opinions, however, generally limit
their discussion to a single provision, usually section 1981, in the belief
that the other theories are essentially equivalent.
The balance of Part I begins with an analysis of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 196463 and considers its application to both federal
prime and subcontractors. This inquiry is germane because two Justices
on the Court when Fulilove v. Klutznick64 was decided assumed Title
VI barred discrimination against MBEs in federal procurement. 6 Part
I ends with a discussion of whether theories based upon section 1981
can remedy discrimination by private firms against MBEs on govern-
ment funded subcontracts and whether section 1981 provides an ef-
fective remedy in purely private transactions.
A. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
In federally funded infrastructure programs, such as the Public
Works Employment Act of 1977, 66 which was the subject of the Ful-
ilove decision, or the more recent Surface Transportation Assistance
Act of 1982,67 local governments receive federal grants68 that they use
imprudent to hazard a guess on the true merits of the allegations of discrimination. See cases
cited infra notes 97, 156, 167. But in the business world one does not lightly sue a potential
customer.
61. See Organization of Minority Vendors, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 579 F. Supp.
574 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Technicable Video Sys. v. Americable, 479 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985).
62. See Hudson Valley Theater, Inc. v. Heimbach, 671 F.2d 702 (2d Cir), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 857 (1982) (alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 2000d, and the
fourteenth amendment); T&S Serv. Assocs., Inc. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d 722 (1st Cir. 1981)
(alleging equal protection and due process violations and violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,
2000d); Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water Districe, 601 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1979) (alleging violations
of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3) and the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
64. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
65. Id. at 506 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting):
66. Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (1977) (codified in significant part at 42 U.S.C. §§
6705(e)-67070) (1982)).
67. Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097 (1982) (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 104 (1983)).
68. Some specific grant statutes contain their own prohibitions against discrimination. See,
e.g., Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 991 (repealed 1982)
(prohibiting discrimination in the federally funded Job Corps); State and Local Fiscal Assistance
Amendments of 1976, 31 U.S.C. § 1242 (amended in scattered sections 31 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6720
(1982)) (repealed 1986) (forbidding discrimination in state and local programs receiving federal
money); Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5309 (1988) (prohib-
iting discrimination in any program or activity supported by federal housing or community
development funds); Energy Conservation and Production Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6870 (1988)
(prohibiting recipients of federal energy conservation grants from discriminating in any activity
supported by the grants).
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to buy goods and services from private firms. The local government's
selection of a prime contractor to provide goods and services in such
a program is subject to Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
69
Title VI provides that: "No person . . . shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. "70 Whether
a government selected prime contractor could discriminate against a
minority firm in the selection of a subcontractor without violating Title
VI depends upon the resolution of a number of issues. These issues
include whether the potential contractual arrangement between the prime
contractor and MBE subcontractor constitutes a "program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance" and whether the procurement of
goods and services under such an arrangement constitutes receipt of
"financial assistance" under Title VI.
(1) "Program or Activity"
To be unlawful under Title VI, the discrimination must occur in
a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. The first
inquiry concerns the phrase "program or activity." Section 606 of the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 7' which amended Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and reversed the result in Grove City College
v. Bell,72 broadly defines the phrase to include all operations of a unit
of state or local government any part of which receives federal financial
assistance.7 1 With respect to a business firm, all operations of the firm
are covered by the prohibition against discrimination if the firm as a
whole is extended federal assistance, or if it is engaged principally in
the business of providing education, health care, housing, social, or
recreational services. In all other cases, only that geographically sep-
arate portion of a private firm receiving assistance is covered. 74 Thus,
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (1988). The complaint in Fullilove alleged that the
MBE set-aside provision was inconsistent with Title VI. The opinion by Justice Burger disagreed
and held that to the extent that an inconsistency might have existed, the MBE provision, the
later and more specific enactment, was controlling. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492
n.77.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
71. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-
4a (1988)).
72. 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (a private college, some of whose students received federal financial
aid, had to comply with federal antidiscrimination laws only in the operation of its financial
aid program).
73. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-
4a (1988)).
74. In the context of a private firm that receives assistance, the relevant language from
[Vol. 42
a commercial prime contractor's selection of its subcontractor for fed-
erally funded procurement would come within the meaning of "pro-
gram or activity" because either the firm as a whole receives federal
assistance or that portion of the firm receiving assistance engages the
relevant subcontractor.
Large federal government contractors, especially those that con-
tract with the Department of Defense, often engage several tiers of
subcontractors. Discrimination by a first tier subcontractor on a federal
procurement contract in the selection of a second tier subcontractor
probably is beyond the scope of the term "program or activity." The
prohibitions of Tide VI against discrimination by a prime contractor
in its selection of a subcontractor do not extend beyond "all the op-
erations of' '7 the prime contractor. By negative implication the statute
could be construed as not addressing discrimination between the first
and second tier subcontractors. This narrow construction is supported
by the absence of language parallel to that applicable to governmental
entities. Section 606, which deals with governmental entities, includes
within the defimition of the term "program and activity" not only all
the operations of the state or local government entity receiving federal
assistance, but also all the operations of each state or local government
entity receiving assistance indirectly through another unit of state or
local government. 6 No comparable language exists for assistance re-
the 1988 amendment defines the term "program or activity" to
mean all the operations of -...
(3)(A) an entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or entire sole
proprietorship -
(i) if assistance is extended to such corporation, partnership, private organization, or
sole proprietorship as a whole; or
(ii) which is principally engaged in the business of providing education, health care,
housing, social services, or parks and recreation; or -
(B) the entire plant or other comparable, geographically separate facility to which
Federal financial assistance is extended, in the case of any other corporation, part-
nership, private organization, or sole proprietorship ...
any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1988).
75. Id.
76. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259 § 606 (1)(B), 102 Stat. 28
(1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000d-4a (1988)). Section 606 provides:
mhe term 'program or activity' and the term 'program' mean all of the operations
of
(1)(A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a
State or a local government; or
(B) the entity of such State or local government that distributes such assistance and
each such department or agency (and each other State or local government entity) to
which the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local
government; ...
any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.
Id. (emphasis added).
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ceived or distributed by private firms. This absence of parallel language
for private firms likely would lead to an interpretation that discrim-
ination by a first tier subcontractor (when the prime contractor receives
assistance) in the choice of second tier subcontractors would not be
included within the "operations" of the prime contractors and would
be beyond the scope of this provision.
(2) "Financial Assistance"
Once a "program or activity" has been found, it is necessary to
address the second issue of whether the phrase "federal financial as-
sistance" encompasses all federal spending or has a more limited mean-
ing. "Assistance" could be interpreted narrowly to mean a payment
in the nature of a subsidy to enable the firm to provide services to the
public, or it could be interpreted more broadly to include expenditures
such as government purchases of office supplies or road construction
services at market rates.
At the time Title VI was being debated in Congress, a narrow
construction was adopted to prevent the loss of pivotal votes." The
legislative history of Title VI clearly shows an intent to exclude from
its coverage the buying of goods and services for the benefit and use
of the federal government. The federal government, acting in the role
of a purchaser in the marketplace like any other buyer, was not con-
sidered to be giving "assistance. ' 78
Even if the legislative history excludes direct federal procurement
for use "in house" by the federal government, it does not necessarily
follow that federal assistance to local governments, such as under the
Public Works Employment Act of 1977, 79 which funds a local gov-
ernment's procurement of roads and public works at commercial rates,
77. See 3 R. CAPPAIUT, FEDERAL GRANTs AND COOPERATwE AonREamtrs: LAW, PoLIcy,
AND PRACTICE § 19:30 (1987 & Supp. 1990). But see Glotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448
(D.D.C. 1972) (broadly construing "federal financial assistance" to include assistance provided
through the tax system).
78. [S]ection 601 excludes federal procurement - the buying of goods and services
for the benefit and use of the United States. In these transactions the payee is not
considered to be "assisted" by the United States; rather, the federal government is
operating in the marketplace like any other buyer. Accordingly, although § 602
specifically refers to contractual aid, normal procurement contracts are excluded. One
would have to show an element of federal subsidy to subsume the "procurement"
under Title VI.
R. CAPPALn, supra note 77, § 19:30 (citing 110 CONG. Rc. 13380 (1964) and 110 CONG. REC.
10076 (1964) (letter from Att'y. Gen. Kennedy to Sen. Cooper)).
79. Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (1977) (codified in significant part at 42 U.S.C. §§
6705(e)-6707(j) (1988)).
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also must be excluded from the coverage of Title VI. Often the purpose
of public construction spending is to assist the local economy and in-
crease employment. 0
A narrow interpretation of "financial assistance," which would
exclude a local government's procurement of goods or services at mar-
ket rates, is suggested by the construction of "program or activity"'"
applied to governmental agencies.A The definition of "program or ac-
tivity" explicitly includes governmental subrecipients within the pro-
gram or activity of the initial governmental recipient.13 No parallel flow
down provisions exist for the receipt of financial assistance for either
government or private firms. This absence suggests that a state or local
government that receives financial assistance which it uses for pro-
curement from a private firm does not provide "financial assistance"
to that firm. This result is consistent with the ordinary meaning of
"financial assistance," since a state or local government's procurement
at market rates from a business firm usually would not be considered
financial assistance to the firm.
However, it still could be argued that, through procurement at
market rates, federal financial assistance is being provided to the state
or local government recipient, to the public generally, or to the prime
contractor's subcontractor. It is unclear who must be subsidized in or-
der for there to be "assistance."' 4
The Supreme Court shed some light on this issue in United States
Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans, 5 which held that
federal funds received as contractual grants by airport authorities were
not federal financial assistance to the airlines that used these facilities
pursuant to numerous contracts with the authorities. The Court drew
a distinction between contractual recipients of subsidies and indirect
beneficiaries of subsidies. 6 The governing principal seemed to be that
"assistance" is the receipt of a subsidy (not procurement at market
rates), and the receipt of that subsidy must be pursuant to a contractual
80. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1077, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1976). This House report,
which discusses the purpose of the bill to make various federal grants available for state and
local construction projects, was accepted by the Conference Committee in preference to the
Senate version. S. CoNF. REP. No. 939, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1976); H.R. CoNF. REP. No.
1260, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1976).
81. See supra note 76.
82. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
83. Id.
84. Even when "assistance" concededly is involved, there remain questions about the extent
to which prohibitions flow down to subrecipients. See R. CAPPALU, supra note 77, §§ 19:36,
19:37.
85. 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
86. Id. at 606-10.
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relationship, as contemplated by the flow down provisions of section
606(1) of Title VI.87 Thus, to be protected by Title VI, MBE subcon-
tractors must be the intended beneficiaries, not the state or local gov-
ernment nor the public generally, and these MBEs must have contractual
relationships with the prime contractor which receives the assistance
as part of a "program or activity" receiving assistance.
This interpretation creates an anomaly. Some statutes may permit
procurement at subsidized rates. The Public Works Employment Act
of 1977 (PWEA)8  and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of
1982 (STAA) 9 were enacted with the ancillary purpose of aiding and
benefitting minority business firms.90 The PWEA recognized that the
bids made by MBEs might be higher than otherwise expected because
they reflect the continuing effects of prior discrimination. 91 Therefore,
procurement under these statutes might be viewed as providing "as-
sistance" directly to the prime contractor for purposes of Title VI. To
the extent that a prime contractor's bid reflects its minority subcon-
tractor's legacy of discrimination, it could be argued that it is a pro-
gram or activity in receipt of federal financial assistance and therefore
is subject to Title VI. If, however, a prime contractor does not select
a minority subcontractor, then its bid presumably would be at market
rates and it would not be in receipt of federal financial assistance. In
the former case, the legal coverage of Title VI would turn on the murky
factual issue of whether any MBEs awarded subcontracts had included
in their bids higher costs reflecting the continuing effects of prior dis-
crimination. Title VI would protect MBEs only in cases in which they
had been awarded subcontracts, making protection unnecessary. On
the other hand, in cases in which MBEs failed to win subcontracts,
indicating a potential need for protection, Title VI would not apply.
Contrary to the Supreme Court's superficial assumption that mi-
nority firms could rely on applicable legislation 92 to prevent their dis-
criminatory exclusion from federal procurement, commercial
procurement at market rates is not covered by Title VI. 93 Minority sub-
87. See id. at 604-12; supra note 76.
88. Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (1977) (codified in significant part at 42 U.S.C. §§
6705(e)-6707(j) (1982)).
89. Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097 (1982) (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 104 (1983)).
90. 123 CONG. Rc. 5097-98 (1977) (Remarks of Rep. Mitchell).
91. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 470 (1980) (discussing PWEA's implementing
guidelines).
92. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989).
93. In his dissenting opinion in Fullilove, which upheld a federal set-aside, Justice Stevens,
who voted with the majority in Croson, wrote:
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 unequivocally and comprehensively prohibits
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contractors-and the vast majority of minority firms are too small to
participate in such procurement as prime contractors-must rely on
other theories for protection against discrimination.94 Protection under
any of these other theories is, as we shall see, just as fanciful.
(3) The Intent Problem
The intent problem creates a dilemma for claims of business dis-
crimination. When intent is a requisite element of the claim, it creates
virtually insurmountable practical problems of proof. If it is elimi-
nated, then no adequate limiting criterion exists to distinguish legiti-
mate claims from bogus ones. Even assuming the practical problems
of proving intent could be overcome, Title VI would do little or nothing
to protect MBEs from discrimination. What protection it does clearly
provide duplicates constitutional protection.
Title VI does provide theoretical protection to minority firms large
enough to participate as prime contractors to state and local govern-
ments that are funded by grants of federal financial assistance, because
the state or local government's operations constitute a "program or
activity" covered by Title VI.95 However, Title VI's coverage does not
extend to protect MBEs holding direct prime contracts with the federal
government, if these contracts were at market rates;96 these transactions
would theoretically be covered by the fifth amendment. 97 Even the lim-
discrimination on the basis of race in any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance. In view of the scarcity of litigated claims on behalf of minority
business enterprises during this period, and the lack of any contrary evidence in the
legislative record, it is appropriate to presume that the law has generally been obeyed.
Fulliove, 448 U.S. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. One theory would be to attribute discrimination against a minority subcontractor by a
prime contractor to the state for purposes of satisfying the state action requirement of § 1983,
if "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action ... so that
the.., latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison,
419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). In Jackson the plaintiff complained of termination of utilities. The
utility operated under a state grant of monopoly at regulated rates, but the Court did not find
state action. In Rendall-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), a private school received 90% of
its funding from public sources to educate maladjusted students, but despite this public function
and financial dependency, the school was not acting for the state when it discharged several
teachers.
95. Private actions may be maintained under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 597 (1983).
96. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
97. In Marshall v. Kleppe, 637 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1980), the court refused to dismiss a
suit brought by an MBE against the federal government under the due process clause of the
fifth amendment for discriminatory cancellation of a loan authorization by the Small Business
Administration. The reasoning employed in this case would apply equally to a suit charging
discrimination by a federal official in the award of a contract for goods or services.
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ited protection that Title VI provides to minority prime contractors
funded by state or local governments may merely duplicate the the-
oretical relief already available under the fourteenth amendment, be-
cause Title VI probably requires a showing of discriminatory intent,
as do fifth and fourteenth amendment claims. 98
If Title VI provides a modicum of protection that expands existing
constitutional protection, it is because there is at least an argument that
it does not require a showing of discriminatory intent. Federal agencies
implementing Title VI have issued regulations that go beyond prohib-
iting intentional discrimination to prohibiting discriminatory effects as
well. Several administrative agencies have pronounced that "a recipient
[of federal funding] . . . shall not . . . utilize criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting persons to discrim-
ination because of their race. . . ."9 Similar agency action, which looks
beyond innocent or neutral motives to discriminatory effects, was up-
held by the Supreme Court in Lau v. Nichols.'°° This result, however,
may have been undermined by Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke,'0° in which five Justices concurred in the view that Title VI
should be read as synonymous with the equal protection clause, which
requires discriminatory intent to ground a violation.10 2
The meaning of discriminatory purpose'03 was developed in Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.'
°4
In this case the plaintiff developer claimed that the Village's refusal
to rezone certain land to allow low and moderate income housing vi-
olated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court held that if the plaintiff proved the village's denial was in part
98. See infra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
99. 15 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(2) (1990) (Dep't of Commerce); 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(i) (1990)
(Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev.); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1990) (Dep't of Health & Human
Services) (emphasis added).
100. 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974).
101. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
102. Id. at 287, 325. Since the intent question was not before the Court, this assessment
may be too pessimistic, but as a practical matter, in the business context there is no adequate
substitute for intent. See infra notes 177-188 and accompanying text (discussing disparate impact
theory); see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
268 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). For a somewhat fuller explanation
of how this came about, see R. CAPPALUi, supra note 77, §§ 19:24-25.
103. The Court has treated "discriminatory purpose," "discriminatory intent," and "dis-
criminatory motive" as interchangeable terms although analytically this leads to considerable
confusion. See Schnapper, supra note 8, at 44-45; Strauss, supra note 8, at 951. Schnapper
argues that the meaning of "intent" is broader than "purpose." For use in this Article, it is
sufficient to note that, however defined, all three terms require proof of subjective states of
mind.
104. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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motivated by race, a discriminatory purpose had been shown.'0 5 To
show a discriminatory purpose, claimants could rely on disparate im-
pact, events leading up to the challenged decision, departures from
normal procedural sequence and usual substantive policies, and the
legislative and administrative history of the action.'16 Then in Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney,' 7 the Court rejected the formulation that a
person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of voluntary
actions. Instead, the Court adopted a more limited definition of "dis-
criminatory purpose" requiring not a mere awareness of consequences,
but "that the decisionmaker ... selected . . a particular course of
action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group.'
' 8
The intent requirement immunizes from redress discrimination
based upon differences resulting from the continuing effects of prior
discrimination, including for example, small size, inadequate capital,
and lack of experience. If a prime contractor will use only large sub-
contractors with considerable capital and experience, it can eliminate
most MBE subcontractors using neutral criteria. Thus, discriminatory
effects can result from facially neutral policies.' 9 A viable legal remedy
for discrimination requires both a legal theory of recovery and access
to the facts necessary to prove the case. When subjective evil intent
is the critical element necessary for recovery, success on the merits be-
comes virtually impossible.
Many other causes of action require proof of intent, such as crim-
inal indictments, or claims for intentional torts. In those actions, how-
ever, the result achieved by the intentional act, harm to a victim, is
both unusual and not otherwise desirable. Intent may be inferred from
the act itself. But in the business context, the result achieved by the
intentional discrimination, a contract with a non-MBE, is a routine and
unremarkable occurrence. Only in extreme cases such as when dis-
criminatory actions so severely affect the MBE that courts presume
bigotry or when no other possibility explains the action can a plaintiff
show intent without an admission by the defendant of culpability.
105. Id. at 265-66.
106. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105, 1112 (1989)
(citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68).
107. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
108. Id. at 279.
109. Some MBEs have used the existence of MBE set-asides or good faith provisions,
coupled with the lack of cooperation received from prime contractors when they attempt to
bid, as a way of showing discriminatory intent. See Khalifa v. State, 397 N.W.2d 382 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986); Technicable Video Sys. v. Americable, 479 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
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The lack of effective protection against business discrimination
even in federal procurement clearly contrasts with the facile assumption
of several Justices in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson1" 0 and Fullilove
v. Klutznick."' As in the era of Plessy v. Ferguson,"2 the Court's pur-
suit of doctrinal symmetry has led it to ignore economic and social
realities.
B. Section 1981 and Equal Protection
Section 1981113 provides the broadest potential basis to redress
claims of business discrimination.11 4 At least in theory, this provision
provides the basis for claims of discrimination that would reach all
three of the paradigmatic transactions: governments with MBE prime
contractors; prime contractors, subcontracting with MBEs on publicly
funded projects; and purely private transactions between commercial
customers and MBE suppliers. Since the analysis under section 1981
and the equal protection analysis under the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments are essentially equivalent" 5 for the issues raised by this Article,
equal protection doctrine will not be discussed separately.1 6
110. 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989).
111. 448 U.S. 448, 540 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding a statute requiring separate accommodations for white
and black persons).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
114. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-70 n.8 (1976), for an explanation of the
controversy surrounding the legislative history of this provision. A historical note appended to
the present codification indicates that this section was derived solely from § 16 of the Act of
May 31, 1870, which itself was enacted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. Yet the majority
opinion in Runyon traced this statute (as § 1977 of the Revised Statutes of 1874) to both § 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (a similar statute enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amendment
and reenacted as § 18 of the Voting Rights Act of 1870) and to § 16 of the 1870 Act. Id. If
based solely on the fourteenth amendment, Justice White argued in his dissent, the prohibitions
of the Act could reach only state actions. Id. at 206 (White, J., dissenting). It would not reach
private action as the Court held in Runyon. If based upon the thirteenth amendment, however,
as held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-38 (1968), § 1981 reaches private
discrimination as a prohibition against the badges and incidents of slavery.
Three articles in the 1989 issue of the Yale Law Journal present the historical evidence and
argue persuasively that Congress intended § 1981 to reach private action. See Kaczorowski, The
Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866: A Legislative History in Light of
Runyon v. McCrary, 98 YALE L.J. 565 (1989); Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruc-
tion History, and the Proper Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541 (1989); Kennedy, Book
Review, 98 YALE L.J. 521 (1989) (reviewing FONER, RECONSTRUCTiON: AMERCA'S U Nsasn
REVOLUTION, 1862-1877 (1988)).
115. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976).
116. Nor will this article pursue two other complications suggested by scenario two: whether
discrimination by a prime contractor against MBEs on a publicly funded project amounts to
state action for purposes of equal protection doctrine; and whether the contractor is acting
"under color of law" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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Section 1981 provides that "[alil persons .. shall have the same
right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white
citizens .... 1117 While this provision has been interpreted broadly as
reaching the making and enforcement of private contracts without re-
quiring state action,118 it also has been interpreted narrowly as rem-
edying only purposeful discrimination. ' 9 Proof of disparate impact is
not enough.'12 Section 1981 does not prohibit decisions made on fa-
cially neutral grounds even if such decisions would adversely affect
MBEs.' 2' As under Title VI, a prime contractor does not violate section
1981 by refusing an MBE's bid because the MBE is small, inexperi-
enced or undercapitalized, even though these characteristics are the
continuing effects of prior discrimination. As a practical matter, even
if a prime contractor deliberately adopts policies or procedures because
they have a disparate impact on minority firms, but leaves no record
of its true purpose, no violation of section 1981 could be shown.
(1) Public Procurement
Although establishing a violation of section 1981 does not require
a showing of state action, a claim is most likely to succeed if it is brought
against a public agency that is subject to the competitive bidding re-
quirements of most public procurement.' 22The obligation imposed on
public agencies to accept the lowest responsible bid'21 provides a basis
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
118. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363
(1989), the Supreme Court reconsidered and affirmed this holding, but it limited the protection
of § 1981 to the formation stage of contracting. Id. at 2369.
119. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389 (1982).
120. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 177-188 (discussing hypothetical local government
legislation which would impose liability upon a showing of disparate impact alone).
121. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 392-97 (invidious discrimination practiced
by a labor union was not imputed to employer who selected employees from those referred by
labor union).
122. Only one such claim ultimately has ever succeeded on the merits in a reported decision.
See Brant Constr. Co. v. Lumen Constr. Co., Inc., 515 N.E.2d 868 (Ind. App. 1987); see also
infra text accompanying note 5, at 217-224.
123. See, e.g., MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE FOR STATE AND LOCAL Gov'Ts §§ 3-202(5), 3-
203(7) (1979). These sections provide, inter alia:
Sec. 3-202(5) Bid Acceptance and Bid Evaluation.... Bids shall be evaluated based
on the requirements set forth in the Invitation for Bids, which may include criteria
to determine acceptability such as inspection, testing, quality, workmanship, delivery,
and suitability for a particular purpose. Those criteria that will affect the bid price
and be considered in evaluation for award shall be objectively measurable, such as
discounts, transportation costs, and total or life cycle costs ....
Sec. 3-203(7) Award. Award shall be made to the responsible offeror whose proposal
is determined in writing to be the most advantageous to the [state] taking into
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to infer discrimination when the low bidder is a responsible minority
firm whose bid has been rejected. When, as in private commercial pro-
curement, no obligation to accept the lowest bid exists and a showing
of intentional discrimination is required, a violation of section 1981
becomes virtually impossible to prove without a confession. Any claim
of discrimination in the selection process could be rebutted by a defense
of cronyism or a similar legal, if hardly laudable, motive. 2
Even in the public procurement context, in which the lowest bid
must be accepted, discrimination remains extremely difficult to prove
since the victim invariably will lack direct proof of the required intent.
The decision in T & S Service Associates, Inc. v. Crenson'1 aptly il-
lustrates this problem. In that decision the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in the most fully articulated application of section 1981 to the
public bidding process, ruled against an MBE despite facts strongly
supporting its claim. The minority firm involved was an experienced
prime contractor, large enough actually to have performed similar con-
tracts successfully in the past. 126 Yet even with the mandated procedures
of the public bidding process, which include, for example, published
specifications, sealed bids, and the obligation to accept the lowest re-
sponsible bid, a large element of subjective discretion involving the
nonprice related terms of the bid entered into the determination of
which firm would receive the contract award. This element of sub-
jectivity enabled the court of appeals to find that the victim had failed
to show intentional discrimination. 27
In T & S, a minority-owned food catering service sued a Rhode
Island Town School Committee and its school superintendent for racial
consideration price and the evaluation factors set forth in the Request for Proposals.
No other factors or criteria shall be used in the evaluation.
Identical language appears in the AMERicAN BAR AssoCIATION MODEL PROCUREMENT ORDI-
NANCE FOR LOCAL GovR mrTrs (1982).
124. More realistically, the minority firm would not even receive timely and accurate bid
specifications. Even if its cost structure enabled it to be the low cost supplier, without the
public notice of bid specifications required in public contracting, the MBE could not submit a
meaningful bid. Moreover, these public sector protections are hardly foolproof. In other contexts
complaints often are voiced that contracts are steered to politically favored firms.
125. 666 F.2d 722 (1st Cir. 1981).
126. T & S Serv. Assoc., Inc. v. Crenson, 505 F. Supp. 938, 940 (D.R.I. 1981).
127. T & S, 666 F.2d at 727. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989), a
mixed motive sex discrimination case, a woman denied promotion to partner in an accounting
firm successfully showed sufficient evidence of intent. Written evaluations downgraded her for
failure to conform to gender stereotypes. The discriminatory intent shown was not found in
the subjective evaluation process but in the objective process that allowed such subjective
impressions to play a role in promotions. Such evidence is probably rare in employment
discrimination cases (and will become even rarer after this case). Similar negative stereotypes
about minority firms are unlikely to be memorialized in the files.
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discrimination in the award of a federally funded school lunch con-
tract.'2 Plaintiff based its claims on the equal protection and due proc-
ess clauses of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. sections
1981, 1983, and 2000d (Title VI).129 Limiting its discussion to section
1981,130 the trial court found intentional discrimination in violation of
that provision, and awarded $22,787 in compensatory damages.' The
court of appeals vacated this judgment and remanded it for further
proceedings in light of its opinion. It held that the trial court inap-
propriately applied the Supreme Court's analysis in McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green,12 which had established a methodology for
evaluating evidence in cases alleging purposeful employment discrim-
ination when direct proof of intentional discrimination is lacking.
In clarifying the T & S trial court's misapplication of the Mc-
Donnell method, the First Circuit set out the McDonnell test as follows:
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance
of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the
plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the defendant 'to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for the employee's rejection.' . . . Third, should the defendant
carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered
by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination."
3
The First Circuit then modified these guidelines to adapt them
from the employment context to the public contract bidding context.
134
128. T & S, 505 F. Supp. at 942.
129. Id. at 940.
130. Id. at 942. The trial court also noted that plaintiff failed to show how analysis of the
§ 1983 claim would differ from the § 1981 analysis when the § 1983 claim was based upon a
disparate treatment theory, and that an equal protection claim would also require proof of
purposeful discrimination. Id.; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (discussion
of constitutionality of written employment test is limited to alleged violation of § 1981).
131. T & S, 505 F. Supp. at 946.
132. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
133. T & S Serv. Assoc., Inc. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d 722, 724 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1983)).
134. Id. at 725. In Selden Apartments v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 785
F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1986), the court also applied McDonnell to a claim of business discrimination.
It considered a claim that HUD had discriminated against a black limited partnership when it
evaluated bids solicited to purchase real estate. The Sixth Circuit upheld a district court's jury
instructions that:
Plaintiff has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
Defendant did not accept Plaintiff's proposal based on a legitimate non-discriminatory
business reason but intentionally discriminated in whole or in part against Plaintiff
because of the racial make-up of its partners.
Plaintiff is not required, however to prove that it is more qualified than the firm
which was selected to receive the property. Discrimination exists if you find Defendant
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The court decided that the rejection of a bid, offering no price or other
significant advantages, from a minority firm that was no more qual-
ified than the firm whose bid was accepted, would not support an in-
ference of intentional discrimination.'35 The court did not require the
minority bidder to show that its bid was the lowest one, since this would
preclude a minority firm with a slightly higher bid and superior cre-
dentials from making a prima facie case. 36 Instead it held that T &
S could
prove its prima facie case of intentional discrimination by showing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (i) T & S is a minority-owned
firm; 37 (ii) T & S's bid met the specifications required of those com-
peting for the contract; (iii) the T & S bid was significantly more ad-
vantageous to the Committee than the bid actually awarded, whether
in terms of price or some other relevant factor;3 and (iv) the
treated Plaintiff less favorably than other businesses because of the racial make-up
of Plaintiff's partners. Plaintiff does not have to prove that race was the sole
motivating factor but it must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that race
was one of the motivating factors.
Id. at 161.
135. T & S, 666 F.2d at 725.
136. Id. at 725 & n.4.
137. The effect of the First Circuit's approach requires the plaintiff to show that the
defendant knew it was a minority-owned firm. "[It is difficult to see how the Committee could
be liable for discrimination in making the first decision .... It is by no means clear from the
record that the Committee knew that T & S was a minority firm . I..." d  at 727. Thus, the
court created a dilemma for the MBE. In T & S, the defendants denied knowing that the
plaintiff was black, but the trial court found testimony that the defendants would not have
told each other that the plaintiff was black "simply inconceivable." T & S Serv. Assoc, Inc.,
v. Crenson, 505 F. Supp. 938, 944 (D.R.I. 1981). The court of appeals' approach requires the
plaintiff to show that each member of a decision group (or perhaps only a majority) had the
requisite knowledge. Because such information would usually be conveyed informally, rather
than memorialized in a document, defendants lacking personal contact with a minority plaintiff
could have convenient memory lapses. Since the plaintiff has the burden of proof and no
documentary evidence, its case might be dismissed at this point.
Furthermore, many MBEs prefer that their racial identity remain unknown, suspecting that
they will benefit if they can "pass" as nonminority firms and avoid even the possibility of
discrimination. The First Circuit's approach, however, requires an MBE to communicate its
status with its solicitation or risk losing its claim if its identity is later learned and subsequent
discrimination occurs. Placing an MBE in this dilemma is unnecessary. Since a defendant only
must articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose for rejecting the MBE's bid, an
innocent defendant is sufficiently protected. Assuming the defendant does not choose capri-
ciously, the plaintiff gains a windfall only if the defendant has a nondiscriminatory reason for
its decision that it cannot reveal, such as bribery.
138. By not requiring that the MBE bid be the lowest, and considering other terms that
make its bid the most attractive, the court thought it lessened the MBE's burden. By introducing
a subjective element, however, it made proof more difficult. Even when the MBE is the low
bidder, it must counter the argument that another bid is in fact more advantageous without
there being hard and fast criteria for this determination. A test that includes a subjective
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Committee selected another contractor. 139
The MBE in T & S could satisfy these prima facie elements, but
after defendants offered purportedly nondiscriminatory reasons for its
rejection of the bid, the MBE also had to show that these reasons were
pretexts. The nondiscriminatory reason offered by the defendant was
that the MBE's bid was deficient because it varied from the required
specifications in five respects. 4° The intent issue then turned on whether
these variations had real significance or were being used as pretexts to
reject the MBEs bid.'
4'
It is understandably difficult to expunge subjective elements en-
tirely from the process of bid evaluation. Customers might ignore mi-
nor variations from bid specifications in a bid submitted by a firm that
has gained their confidence. On the other hand, these same variations
might be viewed as critical in a bid submitted by a firm that lacks their
confidence. Unconscious or conscious'racism' 42 might easily prevent
MBEs from gaining this confidence.
The trial and appellate courts in T & S did not agree in their char-
acterization of the variations from the bid specifications. This disa-
greement reflects the difficulty involved in second-guessing a customer's
characterization of variations from these specifications. Although the
trial court rejected defendants' assertions with respect to bid variations
and found T & S's bid fully qualified, the appellate court viewed the
question of the Significance of the variations as an open one. The ap-
assessment of the attractiveness of a bid permits a defendant to create a post hoc basis for
accepting an advantageous but higher bid. As a result a plaintiff has no objective basis to
determine whether its bid was the most advantageous and thus whether it can establish a prima
facie case. It must resort to litigation, with all the ill will this necessarily creates for customer
relations, based only upon its suspicions of discriminatory treatment.
139. T & S, 666 F.2d at 725; cf. Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073,
1082 (7th Cir. 1987) (in addressing a business discrimination claim arising from a public sector
subcontract, the court, in dicta, outlined a prima fade case of racial discrimination against a
business as: "that [plaintiff] has black participants; that [the firm awarded the contract] does
not; that [plaintiff] made a 'better' bid, but that [the other fim] got the contract").
140. The bid was allegedly deficient because it did not contain: (1) two entree choices; (2)
an analysis of employee benefits; (3) a residential manager; (4) a guarantee of employment of
existing personnel; and (5) a detailed analysis of foods to be served. The trial court found that
the bid contained: (1) two daily entree choices set out in detail; (2) life and health insurance
for employees working over 20 hours per week; (3) a designated on-site supervisor; (4) a
commitment that existing employees would be given first preference for all nonmanagement
positions; and (5) a detailed analysis of foods to be served. T & S, 505 F. Supp. at 943.
141. Id. at 943-44.
142. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. Rav. 317, 335 (1987); see also Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers:
Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. Rv. 733,
744-45 (1987) (discussing racially selective sympathy and indifference).
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pellate court focused on the bid specification requiring that:
the successful bidder "must provide [present] employees an oppor-
tunity to stay with" the food program. The T & S bid promised only
that current employees would be given "first preference of all job
openings." The [winning] Servomation bid, by contrast, stated its
intention to "offer employment to the present staff.' 143
Reasonable people might differ about the significance of this variance.
If any variance at all is permitted, however, the absence of explicit
criteria by which to assess the significance of variations opens the door
to subjective discretion and thus even favoritism or covert discrimi-
nation. In T & S the school committee overlooked some variances in
other bids. It accepted the Servomation bid even though that bid failed
to comply with the requirement that it accept responsibility for cleaning
certain parts of the kitchens. The school committee also considered
another bidder that bid on a one year contract when the bid speci-
fications called for a three-year term.
The most significant bid variation led the defendant to mistakenly
award the contract to Servomation. Due to confusion surrounding the
defendant's bid specifications, four bidders submitted "profit and loss"
bids,'" and of these T & S bid the lowest. After Servomation submitted
a "management fee" bid, 14 which was artificially low, the school com-
mittee selected Servomation. Upon discovering the error it nevertheless
decided to continue with Servomation even though its bid was not the
lowest.'46
T & S claimed that this decision showed discrimination. The school
committee rebutted this charge by asserting that it had proceeded with
Servomation because there was not enough time before the school year
began to rebid the contract, because Servomation had begun prepa-
ration, and because the school was pleased with the company's per-
formance. According to the appellate court's decision, T & S had the
burden of demonstrating that the reasons advanced by the school com-
mittee were pretextual "by showing that the asserted reasons were in-
sufficient to explain the employer's decision or were not applied in a
143. T & S, 666 F.2d at 726.
144. In a "profit and loss" bid the bidder provides meals at a fixed cost and bears the risk
that expenses will exceed revenues including government subsidies. T & S, 666 F.2d at 723-24
n.1.
145. In a "management fee" bid the bidder receives a set fee per unit and the school pays
all costs and collects all revenues. Id.
146. Id. at 726-27. Servomation's bid did not include total costs because it did not reflect
federal and state reimbursement subsidies. When these were included, Servomation's bid exceeded
T & S's bid.
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nondiscriminatory fashion, or by proving that a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated the employer." 1 47
T & S also attempted to show intentional discrimination by show-
ing that the school administrators visited the operations of either all
or all but one of the other bidders, but did not visit T & S's operations
despite its aggressive marketing efforts and despite the fact that it op-
erated locally."48 The trial court concluded that defendant's failure to
visit a locally based firm "bespeaks only of bad faith.'
' 49
The court of appeals viewed these same facts much more favorably
for the defendants. The defendants only had to articulate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the T & S bid, having only a
burden of production and not a burden of persuasion. 50 The burden
of production required the defendants "only to introduce admissible
evidence which raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether they dis-
criminated against plaintiff."' 5' If the plaintiff showed direct credible
evidence of improper motivation, only then would the burden of per-
suasion shift to the defendant to show that it would have made the
same decision even if it had not considered the impermissible factor. 152
This formulation comes perilously close to requiring direct proof of
intent, of a subjective state of mind. In complex business transactions
reasons always can be advanced, as here, to justify a particular choice
and excuse what may be covert discrimination.
Even if on remand the plaintiff could negotiate this gauntlet, the
difficult task of showing damages remained. In this aspect of the case
the court of appeals again placed an inappropriate and unnecessary
burden on the plaintiff, perhaps because it adhered too closely to the
employment discrimination analogy. It imposed on the plaintiff a mit-
igation obligation analogous to one found in awards of back pay in
employment discrimination cases, in which amounts earned in other
employment reduce the award.'53 The court held that:
147. Id. at 727.
148. T & S Serv. Assoc., Inc. v. Crenson, 505 F. Supp. 938, 944 (D.R.I. 1981). T & S
twice visited the defendant Barrington schools, met with school officials, provided copies of its
contracts with other Rhode Island schools where it provided food services, and spoke several
times with school officials by phone. Id. at 940.
149. Id. at 945.
150. T & S, 666 F.2d at 725-26.
151. Id. at 726.
152. Id. at 727; see also Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1982)
(holding that once unconstitutional motive was proved, the defendant can rebut only by proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have been reached in the
absence of that factor).
153. T & S, 666 F.2d at 728.
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T & S failed completely to demonstrate that it actually lost money
as a result of the alleged discrimination; it may have engaged in other
jobs during the relevant period which it could not have handled had
it been awarded the Barrington contract. If so, its actual earnings
should have been subtracted from what it would have earned absent
the discrimination.
54
This mitigation requirement presupposes that a business, like an
employee, has a finite number of hours during which it can perform
work. A business, however, can expand far beyond the activities of
a single individual. The mitigation obligation unfairly requires the
plaintiff to show that it could have expanded its activities to perform
both the work it did perform and the work it lost due to the discrim-
ination. To meet this requirement a plaintiff would have to show that
it could have obtained the necessary working capital and hired the ad-
ditional manpower. Absent firm commitments from banks or clearly
available equipment and employees, a court might well dismiss as spec-
ulative most evidence introduced to meet this requirement. It is unlikely
that a plaintiff, already injured by having futilely expended resources
seeking a contract denied it by discrimination, would expend still more
resources to find additional employees, equipment, and working capital
to prove that it could have expanded. Since most businesses continually
attempt to grow, the fairer procedure would place on the defendant
the burden of showing any special circumstances that would prevent
the plaintiff from expanding.
As it stands, given the extreme difficulty of proving intentional
discrimination and the adverse impact on marketing efforts that law-
suits against potential customers create, this formulation of damages
can only be described as a booby prize. MBEs with the resources to
bid competitively on prime contracts and to litigate these issues will
have likely "mitigated" their damages. Those that have not may well
lack the resources to pursue such claims or even continue in business.
The most common time that suppliers and customers sue each other
is when one or the other is going out of business. If an MBE, driven
out of business by racial exclusion, should bring such a claim and win,
its victory truly could be termed pyrrhic.
(2) Private Procurement
Claims against private firms for discrimination in transactions not
involving public funds present the most difficult problems of proof.
Unlike the statutory obligation in the public sector, that procurement
be accomplished with both competitive bidding and the acceptance of
the lowest responsible bid, in the private sector customers often choose
154. Id.
1284 [Vol. 42
their suppliers for noneconomic reasons such as friendship, social, po-
litical, or ethnic ties, or feelings of animosity towards a competing bid-
der, or for economic reasons prohibited in public procurement, such
as returning a business favor, or wanting to develop an alternative sup-
plier. Prohibiting these bases of choice in the private sector would raise
problems regarding freedom of association under the first amend-
ment,'5 5 or of due process infringement under the fifth or fourteenth
amendments.
No case has articulated clearly the requirements under section 1981
for a prima facia showing of business discrimination in a private trans-
action. Virtually no decisions have been reported involving litigation
in this area.' 56 In view of this paucity, despite the fact that the contract
in T & S involved a public sector prime contract, because the court
analyzed the case under section 1981, its analysis may be adaptable to
a claim of discrimination in a private business transaction.
The first problem with this adaptation arises from the lack of man-
datory bidding rules and procedures in the private sector analogous to
those in the public sector. It is unclear how a plaintiff MBE would
make the showings the court required.5 7 In a private sector transaction
an MBE usually would not know of a specific contract opportunity,
the time schedule for bidding, or bid specifications. The plaintiff thus
would have difficulty showing that its "bid met the specifications re-
quired of those competing for the contract.'1 5  If after the fact it con-
structed a hypothetical bid to show what it would have bid, and this
hypothetical bid met the required specifications, the plaintiff still would
have to show that its bid "was significantly more advantageous ...
than the bid actually awarded, whether in terms of price or some other
155. See, e.g., New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that first amendment rights to freely associate may shield
private noncommercial groups from antidiscrimination laws).
156. Three cases have been reported. In Howard Sec. Servs. v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 516
F. Supp. 508 (D. Md. 1981), a corporation was held to have standing to sue under § 1981
because it was wholly owned and operated by its black president. In Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream
Co. v. D & L Ice Cream Co., 576 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), a franchisor sued to
terminate a licensee because of trademark infringement and unfair competition and the licensee
counterclaimed under § 1981 alleging that termination was sought because the franchisee was
black. Because the franchisee consistently failed to pay rent or invoices for ice cream, failed to
abide by the franchise agreement, and sold another brand of ice cream in the trademarked
containers, it failed to show that the license had been terminated for discriminatory reasons. In
Randle v. Lasalle Telecommunications, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1474 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd, 876
F.2d 563 (7th Cir. 1989), an MBE claimed a violation of § 1981, but the claim was dismissed
because the plaintiff failed to establish either direct evidence of discrimination or that defendant's
nondiscriminatory explanation for its action was pretextual.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 137-139.
158. T & S Serv. Assoc., Inc. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d 722, 725 (Ist Cir. 1981).
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relevant factor." 15 9 Even if the plaintiff could show that it made the
best bid, it also would have to show that it did not use hindsight to
prepare its after-the-fact best bid. Unless the plaintiff also has a pre-
viously published price list, or equivalent records for the goods or serv-
ices being purchased, it would have difficulty rebutting the suspicion
of self-serving hindsight. Published price lists exist only for commodity
goods, typically stocked in inventory, or routine services, but even then
the plaintiff's bid would be deficient unless service or maintenance re-
quirements, delivery schedules, and warranties were irrelevant.
Even to bring such an action entails difficult and significant busi-
ness risks, in addition to the ill will that lawsuits usually generate. A
private customer rarely makes a public announcement of the amount
of a winning bid. Short of using commercial espionage, only by bring-
ing suit and using discovery could an MBE that suspects discrimination
verify the terms of the winning bid and determine whether its own bid
would have been more advantageous. Such a suit, especially if ulti-
mately unfounded, will not generate the good will necessary to per-
suade a reluctant potential customer to consider the MBE as a future
supplier. It may also result in Rule 11 sanctions against counsel filing
the suit. 160
Moreover, customers and suppliers often negotiate the specifi-
cations in their contracts. They engage in dialogue and exchange in-
formation in order to agree on final specifications. This process typically
develops specifications that only the supplier involved can meet. This
even happens in the public sector despite regulations designed to dis-
courage it. In the private sector it would be difficult to overcome such
indirect favoritism and show deliberate discrimination by a customer.
The difficulty of showing discrimination is compounded in a pri-
vate sector transaction by the many legitimate business needs that can
justify rejecting a low bid. For example, a customer might legitimately
choose a higher priced supplier over a lower priced minority supplier
to return an earlier favor. This situation might arise if the favored sup-
plier performed an earlier contract despite unanticipated problems and
suffered a loss on the transaction. In addition, a customer might decide
to pay an important supplier a higher price to generate good will and
ensure a supply in times of market shortages. Thus, even if an MBE
could overcome the difficulties of a section 1981 suit in the private
159. Id.
160. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11; Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073,
1082 (7th Cir. 1987) (involving a claim of business discrimination where the court imposed Rule
11 sanctions for attorneys fees).
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sector by showing that its previously published prices were lower than
the bid accepted and that it would have satisfied the third requirement
of the T&S formula without the benefit of hindsight, a customer that
wanted to discriminate could still successfully do so by showing one
of many commercially valid reasons why it chose not to select the MBE
supplier.
At best, a private sector section 1981 challenge amounts to an ac-
ademic exercise. Given the difficulties presented by such a suit, only
a foolhardy MBE would incur the wrath of potential customers by
filing such a suit. As a practical matter these actions cannot succeed.
There remains, however, the possibility that legislation could be de-
signed to overcome the practical difficulties encountered. The next Part
considers this possibility.
H. Can a Remedy Be Created?
To provide a legislative remedy permitting private plaintiffs to bring
suit introduces a novel issue into antidiscrimination law. In other civil
rights areas the injured parties are natural individuals. In this instance
the probable claimant would be a corporation. Although sole pro-
prietorships and partnerships also might bring claims, corporations ac-
count for the overwhelming share of business activity. The novel feature
is that corporations, as legal fictions, traditionally have not been con-
sidered to have a race, and this raises the issue of standing.
A. Standing
At least on the issue of standing some courts appropriately have
taken a practical approach to business discrimination and have allowed
corporations to bring racial discrimination claims. Not all courts, how-
ever, have been able to escape abstract doctrine and permit recognition
of the real persons behind minority firms. The Supreme Court in Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.'6' stated in dicta, "a corporation, as a faceless creature of the
state, may not assert claims of racial discrimination under the Four-
teenth Amendment on its own behalf, and cannot be the 'target' of
racial discrimination. ' 162 Subsequent court of appeals decisions have
declined to embrace this formulation, and these decisions provide sub-
161. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
162. Id. at 263.
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stantial authority that a corporation can assert such claims. 63 The Su-
preme Court later buttressed this view in Fullilove v. Klutznick'64 and
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,165 in which it implicitly rec-
ognized that corporations can have a race by allowing white owned
corporations to challenge set-asides on constitutional reverse discrim-
ination grounds.'6
Courts have attributed the race of a sole shareholder to his cor-
poration. 67 No court has decided whether the same result would follow
in corporations with numerous shareholders, and no court has decided
what race would be assigned to a corporation with both minority and
nonminority shareholders. Set-aside regulations have been more ex-
plicit. To be eligible for most set-asides, minorities must own at least
a majority of the shares and control the business affairs of the cor-
poration. '6 These regulations, however, do not address whether ma-
jority ownership means majority voting rights or the right to receive
a majority of the economic benefits of ownership. 69 In more com-
plicated ownership structures courts potentially could look beyond the
racial identity of shareholders to that of management or even to the
public's perception of the corporation.
The court of appeals decision in Hudson Valley Freedom Theater,
Inc. v. Heimbach170 involved some of these issues, but it did not de-
163. See Novetsky, Federal Practice and Procedure I, Standing, 1983 ANN. SuiRv. OF Am.
L. 345, 354-57 (1984); Note, Corporate Standing to Allege Race Discrimination in Civil Rights
Actions, 69 VA. L. REv. 1153 (1983) (authored by Robert N. Strassfeld); Comment, A
Corporation of a Different Color: Hudson Valley Freedom Theater, Inc. v. Heimbach, 49
BRoosm L. REv. 1179 (1983) (authored by John D. Dalton).
164. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
165. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
166. Id. at 510-11. Racial standing for a corporation only has been an issue when minority
firms have sued. When nonminority firms sue to challenge set-asides, the courts have assumed
standing. Counsel defending set-asides would not raise the standing issue because it would
undermine their client's strategic position if they should ever claim business discrimination.
167. See Marshall v. Kleppe, 637 F.2d 1217, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 1981); Howard Sec. Servs.
v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 516 F. Supp. 508, 513 (D. Md. 1981).
168. "'Minority business enterprise' ... means ... at least 51 per centum owned by one
or more minorities ... or, in the case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of
the stock of which is owned by one or more minorities .... 49 C.F.R. § 23.5 (1990).
169. In more complex capital structures, by using nonvoting cumulative preferred stock, an
investor without any voting rights at all may receive all of the distributed earnings of the firm.
Minorities with voting and operating control might receive only their salaries. If options,
warrants, convertible preferred, and convertible debt are added to the capital structure and
restrictive provisions added to the corporate charter, the determination of control may be
situational and dependent upon future events.
170. 671 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982). In this case, a not-for-
profit organization that produced theatrical productions for black and Hispanic audiences sued
local government executives and the county alleging that its grant application was denied for
racial reasons. It sought relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 2000d, and the equal
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velop any general principles to resolve them. The court recognized the
standing of a not-for-profit corporation that alleged racial discrimi-
nation against it by local government executives who had failed to ap-
prove its grant application. 17 1 As a not-for-profit corporation it had
no shareholders, so the court determined the corporation's racial iden-
tity by its corporate purpose and past activity. 72 Since it had produced
theatrical productions for minority audiences, it was found to have
standing.
The problem created by this expansive approach to standing is that
the determination of whether the corporate purpose benefits minorities
involves subjective value judgments. One could argue that such special
minority theater programs, rather than affirming the cultural identity
of minorities, reinforce their isolation and inhibit their assimilation.173
Also, many opponents of affirmative action argue that their actions
benefit minorities in the long term. Is a court to accept such a statement
of purpose at face value? If not, by what standards should it reject
it? 174
A court could respond by denying standing to not-for-profit cor-
porations claiming discrimination, but this would produce at least one
anomaly. Under Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water District,75 a not-for-
profit corporation has "an implied right of action against any other
person who, with a racially discriminatory intent, interferes with [its]
right to make contracts with non-whites."' 76 Given this view, it would
be difficult to deny standing when the not-for-profit is the direct target
of discrimination because it is perceived as a minority organization.
Perhaps the most useful conclusion to be drawn is that the legal doc-
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The judgment of the trial
court, dismissing the complaint for lack of standing to raise questions under the equal protection
clause and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, was reversed by the court of appeals.
171. Id. at 706.
172. Id.
173. This assumes that assimilation would be desirable, an issue with its own controversy.
174. For the moment this problem seems more theoretical than real. What could substitute
for purpose and past activity? Could the court rely on whether minorities comprise a majority
of its board of directors? (Notably, directors typically are selected at least as much for their
fund raising ability as for whatever wisdom they can offer to guide the corporation.) The race
of the executive staff might be considered, but how would the various offices be weighted?
Would one minority CEO outweigh two nonminority vice presidents or vice versa? These
questions demonstrate the theoretical problems.
175. 601 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1979) (Judge Wyzanski sitting by designation); see also Heritage
Homes of Attleboro, Inc. v. Seekonk Water Dist., 648 F.2d 761 (Ist Cir.); vacated and
remanded, 454 U.S. 807, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898 (1981); Heritage Homes of Attleboro, Inc.
v. Seekonk Water Dist., 670 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1120, cert. denied, 459
U.S. 829 (1982).
176. Des Vergnes, 601 F.2d at 14.
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trines applicable to claims of business discrimination reflect the lack
of attention paid them by legal scholars and legislators.
B. Surrogates for Intent
(1) Disparate Impact
The difficulty of showing intent is the major impediment to rem-
edying business discrimination. None of the theories available under
current law imposes liability without a showing of intentional discrim-
ination. Employment discrimination law, however, provides a potential
alternative approach that does not require proof of intent. Under Title
VII,177 disparate impact theory, first recognized by the Supreme Court
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,"78 imposes liability for employment dis-
crimination even without the presence of invidious intent. Originally,
disparate impact theory prohibited neutral employment practices that
had a disproportionately adverse impact on minorities unless those
practices were justified by business necessity. 179 Recent decisions require
only that defendants justify these practices with a legitimate business
purpose. 180 The business necessity justification existed if statistical data
demonstrated that no other practice could achieve the required business
result. The demonstration validated the business justification. The ab-
sence of an intent requirement makes disparate impact theory a po-
tential candidate for a new legislative remedy for business discrimination.
Whether it can be usefully adapted from the employment to the busi-
ness context remains to be seen. 181
177. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1988).
178. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
179. Id. at 432.
180. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) and Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) have changed the nature of the business justification
required for a neutral practice having an adverse impact on a minority group. The burden of
showing business necessity has shifted from being part of the defendant's affirmative defense
to an element of the plaintiff's case. Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 660; Watson, 487 U.S.
at 998. The nature of the burden has changed further from one of business necessity to merely
business purpose. Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 659. Disparate impact theory may no
longer be distinguishable from covert intentional discrimination. See Brodin, Reflections on the
Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The Employment Discrimination Decisions and the Abandonment
of the Second Reconstruction, 31 B.C.L. Rav. 1, 5-11 (1990). The Court's interpretation has
been the subject of legislative action seeking to undo the 1988 Term's damage. See S. 2104,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
Whatever the applicable standards for disparate impact in Title VII cases, applying them in the
business context would require new legislation. New legislation could reject the current Supreme
Court's approach in favor of the one pending in Congress.
181. At least one state court decision cryptically upheld a disparate impact claim of business
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The particularized settings of most business transactions make a
disparate impact theory, which requires a statistical basis, difficult to
apply. To make useful statistical comparisons, data must be collected
from a large number of similar transactions. Otherwise, statistical dis-
crepancies purporting to reveal a disproportionately adverse impact on
minorities have in reality no statistical significance since they could
result from chance. 82 Only in rare circumstances would the defendant
firm have engaged in enough similar transactions during a time of sta-
ble market conditions for the collection of credible data.
One seemingly neutral business practice with a disproportionately
adverse effect on minority firms (because on average they tend to be
less experienced) is the strong preference for doing business with firms
that have performed successfully in the past or have substantial prior
experience.'83 Validation studies demonstrate that a neutral criterion is
job (or contract) related and permit companies to use the criterion for
selecting employees (or suppliers).'1 These studies, however, are dif-
ficult to develop and interpret even for large groups of unskilled or
semi-skilled workers employed by a single firm. Furthermore, such
studies would be extremely expensive, difficult (if not impossible) to
conduct, and unlikely to go unchallenged.
Consider a firm that is accused of discrimination in its purchase
of computer services because it used prior performance as a key de-
terminant in awarding the contract. Which transactions would provide
data showing disparate impact if minority plaintiffs challenged the fa-
discrimination against a motion to dismiss, but it did not indicate the statutory or constitutional
basis for its decision. See Khalifa v. State, 397 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (relying
on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which formulated an alternative
means by which discriminatory motives can be inferred when a set-aside program is ignored).
182. See Cranor & Nutting, Scientific and Legal Standards of Statistical Evidence in Toxic
Tort and Discrimination Suits, 9 LAw & Pin. 115 (1990).
Traditionally, scientists have accepted statistical evidence which satisfies a 95 percent (or 99
percent) rule-that is, only evidence which has less than five percent (or one percent) probability
of resulting from chance.
When uncritically adopted as a rule for admitting legal evidence, the 95 percent rule distorts
the balance of interests historically protected by the legal system. Plaintiffs in employment
discrimination suits are effectively held to a heavier burden of proof in showing that their
injuries were more probably than not caused by the defendant's actions. The result is that too
many victims of employment discrimination cannot win legal redress for their injuries. Id. at
154-55.
183. Another common facially neutral business practice with a disproportionately adverse
impact on minority firms is the use of social networks, which tend to be segregated, as business
networks. So long as character and integrity remain important concerns in business relationships,
and social relationships provide insights and information about these traits, such a business
practice serves a valuable business purpose. Whether this business practice is a business necessity
is another question.
184. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moorly, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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cially neutral practice of requiring prior successful performance for
prospective suppliers? Could data from all purchases of computer serv-
ices be used? This would include not only a diverse group of suppliers,
but also a variety of transactions. The transactions might vary in size,
length of term, working capital needed for performance, sophistication
and proprietary nature of the technology used to provide the service,
timeliness of performance requirements, staffing requirements, geo-
graphic locations, and a host of other factors. Suppliers might vary
by size, previous experience in the industry, previous experience with
that customer or its competitors, previous experience providing the spe-
cific services required, financial or technical resources, reputation, in-
terpersonal relationships or history with the customer, or key divisions
or personnel.
Prior successful performance might be critical if the supplier must
service customized applications or of little significance if the services
required are available on a commodity basis. Even commodity services,
those required for numerous geographic locations, on short notice and
in intensive amounts, might put staffing, organizational, and working
capital demands on the supplier that would raise prior successful per-
formance to the critical level. Other variables would have a similar
effect on the comparability of data collected. If the statistical study
pared down the group of transactions examined to those involving the
purchase of computer services at similar times and locations with sim-
ilar technological requirements and in similar amounts, the group likely
would consist of too few transactions to have statistical significance.
Broadening the pool of transactions studied to include similar (however
defined) transactions by other purchasers adds the complication that
different purchasers may have widely varying priorities, business plans,
and organizational cultures. 85
These complications would add insurmountable complexities to
validation studies already notorious for their difficulty. 8 6 Absent the
185. To study these transactions would require extensive cooperation by many companies
over considerable periods of time, and these other companies would have neither a financial
incentive to cooperate nor, as nonparties, a legal compulsion. Why should firms that are not
parties to a discrimination action voluntarily assume the financial risks and burden of abandoning
a standard business practice just so it can be scientifically validated? To validate such a common
practice would require convincing firms in a particular industry to use some other factor to
select suppliers that would be racially neutral, perhaps a lottery or some other random selection
process. Such cooperation is unlikely to occur without legal compulsion, and compelling
cooperation, assuming a public purpose could be found, could amount to a constitutional taking
for which compensation must be provided. Attempting to circumvent this problem by joining
all firms needed to conduct a validation study as a class of defendants creates its own problems,
since class action requirements then would have to be met.
186. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3 (1988), in which
the Court referred to some of the criticisms made of statistical studies.
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legal justification provided by such validation studies, widely used neu-
tral business practices, such as using prior good performance as a basis
for renewing a supplier,' would be jeopardized by the disparate im-
pact approach. Since validation studies rarely can meet the business
necessity standard, the defendant, with the burden of proving necessity,
invariably would lose. 188 Banning such pervasive and wide ranging prac-
tices might have dire consequences for the economy, especially if these
practices have the utility commonly perceived in the business com-
munity. In any event, legislation barring practices so fundamental to
business activity would meet intense and probably successful opposi-
tion.
(2) Noncompliance with an MBE Program
Given the difficulty of showing intentional discrimination, imag-
inative counsel have attempted to provide a surrogate for intent in a
particular transaction or to plead theories that do not rely on the civil
rights statutes or constitutional provisions. For example, a failure to
comply with even a good faith MBE program has been used as sur-
rogate proof of intentional discrimination. Good faith MBE programs
impose a best efforts obligation on a prime contractor to seek out MBE
subcontractors without mandating a specific MBE percentage share.'8 9
If the defendant prime contractor fails even to contact MBEs that so-
licit opportunities to bid, then presumably it intentionally has discrim-
inated against them.
Another approach seeks to create an implied private right of action
187. See, e.g., supra note 183. Other widely used neutral business practices include requiring
suppliers to have sufficient bonding capacity, acceptable credit ratings, or relevant industry
certifications.
188. In Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Court justified
its evisceration of disparate impact theory by expressing its fear that otherwise an employer
"could be haled into court and forced to engage in the expensive and time-consuming task of
defending the 'business necessity' of the methods used to select the other members of his
workforce. The only practicable option for many employers will be to adopt racial quotas."
Id. at 652.
189. At the federal level, for example, see Amendment to the Small Business Act and the
Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 95-507, § 211, 92 Stat. 1757, 1767 (1978)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 632, 637)
It is the policy of the United States that small business concerns, and small business
concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals,
shall have the maximum practicable opportunity to participate in the performance of
contracts let by any Federal agency.
For a local government counterpart, see Technicable Video Sys., Inc. v. Americable, 479 So.
2d 810, 811 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see also infra notes 209-212 and accompanying text.
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so MBEs can intervene directly with recalcitrant local bureaucracies and
force compliance with the terms of "soft" MBE programs, namely
those that lack vigorous implementation. A third approach argues that
good faith MBE participation obligations, imposed on prime contrac-
tors in procurement contracts with governments, create third party ben-
eficiary contract rights. None of these attempts has proceeded beyond
preliminary skirmishes, and all have met with mixed success.
Each of these alternatives uses the existence of MBE programs as
a critical element.190 The first approach, using noncompliance with MBE
programs to show discrimination, could be used against either the ju-
risdiction subject to the program'9' or against the prime contractors
obligated under the terms of the program to make some effort to use
MBE subcontractors. In Williams v. City of Sioux Falls,192 the plaintiff
tried to demonstrate that Sioux Falls engaged in a pattern and practice
of intentional discrimination against minority contractors by disre-
garding federal and local MBE regulations. 19 The evidence presented
to show noncompliance included testimony by a former city MBE com-
pliance officer of instances in which the city failed to fulfill MBE par-
ticipation goals and notice requirements. To rebut this, the then current
MBE compliance officer explained why MBE requirements either had
not applied to the project or actually had been satisfied. The trial court
noted two instances in which city contractors failed to comply fully
with MBE requirements and the city failed to take adequate corrective
action. In one case the federal government had revoked funding as a
result of noncompliance. 194 The plaintiff also relied on administrative
determinations by the Sioux Falls Human Relations Commission and
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development that
190. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), made the status of state
and local MBE programs constitutionally suspect. In effect, the Court declared MBE programs
unnecessary because of antidiscrimination legislation, while at the same time undermining the
ability of minority plaintiffs to pursue individual claims of business discrimination. Id. at 509-
11.
191. Federal grants to state and local government often contain set-asides or good faith
MBE programs. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980), the Court upheld such a
federal program in the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, presently codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6705(e)-6707(j) (1982). The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, presently codified
at 23 U.S.C. § 104 (1983), contained a similar provision. Local bureaucracies often ignore or
circumvent these MBE obligations. See infra notes 192-208 and accompanying text.
192. 846 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1988).
193. Id. at 510-11. As an alternate theory, the plaintiff argued that violation of MBE
regulations was actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 511. The court of appeals found it
unnecessary to reach this contention because it concluded, without explanation, that any
violations of MBE regulations were insignificant and unlikely to occur again. Id. at 513.
194. Id. at 512.
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the city had discriminated against minority contractors. Both the trial
and appellate courts found these administrative determinations un-
persuasive since they were based on a finding only of probable cause
without the benefit of an adversarial proceeding. 95
In sustaining the trial court's decision, the Eighth Circuit decided
that "evidence of a failure to implement an affirmative action plan can
amount to circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, [but] it
does not, by itself, support a finding that the City treated minorities
in a less than equal manner because of race."'9 To succeed in its claim
of a pattern and practice of discrimination, the plaintiff needed to show
"that 'discrimination was the [City's] standard operating procedure-
the regular rather than the unusual practice." ' 97
Plaintiff's weak factual case may have dictated its litigation strat-
egy of showing that the city adhered to a general policy of discrim-
ination instead of attempting to show that the city discriminated in
specific dealings with the plaintiff. The plaintiff had submitted a losing
bid of $5,000 to remove a structure from and clear a city-owned site.
Because the winning bidder intended to salvage and reuse the structure
in its own business, it submitted a bid of only one dollar. The plaintiff
was unaware of the procedures or even the possibility that such a bid
could be made. The court found no intentional discrimination in the
city's failure to so inform the plaintiff.1 98 The city treated the plaintiff
the same as it did every other contractor with respect to the salvage
possibility and provided it several hours of extra assistance in preparing
its bid; it did not provide nonminority contractors such assistance. The
plaintiff introduced no evidence that it would have bid less than one
dollar nor that it had an alternate use for the structure to be removed.19
The Second Circuit also has ruled on an attempt to use inadequate
implementation by a local government entity of a federally required
MBE program to show discrimination. In Jones v. Niagara Frontier
Transportation Authoritym an MBE bid unsuccessfully on a number
of large prime contracts. 201 It sought to enjoin award of the contracts
195. Id. at 513 n.4.
196. Id. at 512.
197. Id. (quoting Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1984)
(quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977))). The
requirement that the plaintiff also produce evidence of discriminatory intent in transactions to
which it was not even a party creates a difficult hurdle.
198. Id. at 511-12.
199. Id. at 512.
200. 524 F. Supp. 233 (W.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 836 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1987).
201. Id. at 235-36.
July 1991]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
to a competing nonminority firm claiming discrimination. On one con-
tract, the MBE had the lowest bid at $8,725,292-about $900,000 be-
low the transportation authority engineer's estimate-while the
successful nonminority firm bid the second lowest at $11,196,328. The
MBE was the low bidder on five of seventeen contracts, but was awarded
none. tD On a related contract of nearly the same size the winning bid
from a nonminority firm was nearly $650,000 below the engineer's es-
timate. The Authority based its refusal to award the contract to the
MBE on its failure to submit the required ten percent bid bond and
because it was not a "responsible and responsive" bidder. This latter
conclusion was based upon plaintiff's lack of financial resources ($974
in cash), lack of necessary equipment (less than $50,000 worth), and
lack of major contracting experience (no project larger than $136,000
in the previous five years).203 The plaintiff also conceded it was "broke"
at oral argument.
The federal statute under which funding for the work was being
provided obligated the Authority to "[provide] assistance to MBEs in
overcoming barriers such as the inability to obtain bonding, financing,
or technical assistance." 204 Yet the authority in this case never provided
any assistance. The court denied the request for a preliminary in-
junction, finding it merely "ironic that plaintiff's lack of bonding is
a major reason asserted by the NFTA for its refusal to award plaintiff
a contract when the NFTA had refused to help plaintiff obtain bonding
in apparent derogation of its duty under federal regulations."M 5
Both of these decisions involved MBEs with characteristics which
reflected (or at least were similar to) economic disadvantages resulting
from earlier historical discrimination. As prime contractors, both were
marginal firms with clear disadvantages that could justify the rejection
of their bids. Ironically, despite the existence of MBE programs, which
are intended to compensate for MBEs' disadvantages, jurisdictions still
are able to use these disadvantages to reject MBE bids.
A more favorable situation develops when an MBE subcontractor
sues a prime contractor because it has failed to perform its MBE pro-
gram obligation to seek out and make good faith efforts to use minority
subcontractors. If a prime contractor seeks to avoid its obligation en-
tirely, some racial animus might be inferred by a court. Even con-
tractual obligations limited to good faith or best efforts expand the
202. Id. at 238.
203. Id. at 236.
204. Id. at 239 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 23.45(c)(2) (1990)).
205. Id.
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legal possibilities for MBEs to challenge their exclusion from subcon-
tracting. The MBE subcontractors, however, still are faced with the
problem of proving intent if a clever prime contractor solicits bids from
MBEs but rejects them for covert discriminatory reasons. Since the
prime contractor has no obligation to select the lowest responsible bid,
the good faith or best efforts obligation alone might not justify an
inference of discrimination if an MBE's low bid were rejected. Under
reasoning similar to that in Williams v. City of Sioux Falls2 6 and Jones
v. Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority,2°7 courts also might re-
quire the MBE to demonstrate that its characteristics as a supplier ex-
ceeded those of the winning bidder and to rebut any business reasons
advanced to explain the rejection of the lowest bid.m
While federal courts have not welcomed these claims, a few state
courts have been more receptive. In Technicable Video Systems v.
Americable,2 an MBE sued Americable claiming it had ignored a good
faith MBE provision in its nonexclusive license from the city of Miami
to operate and maintain a cable television system. The complaint al-
leged that on numerous occasions Americable had refused to engage
in negotiations with the plaintiff MBE and that the defendant lacked
the required MBE participation. Relying on a third party beneficiary
theory, the plaintiff argued that the MBE provision had been enacted
to benefit a limited class to which the plaintiff belonged. In sustaining
the theory, the appellate court allocated the burden to the plaintiff to
prove it was 'qualified and
competent to perform the task contracted for in a reasonably work-
manlike and timely fashion at a competitive, though not necessarily
the lowest, price. The defendants, on the other hand, may avoid li-
ability by producing evidence demonstrating that they in fact made
reasonable and good faith efforts to meet the goal of... MBE par-
ticipation.210
The standards of "competent," "reasonably workmanlike and
timely fashion," and "competitive, though not necessarily the lowest
price" that Technicable Video requires provide little definitive guid-
206. 846 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1988).
207. 524 F. Supp. 233 (W.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 836 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1987).
208. See supra text accompanying note 155 for examples of business reasons that justify
accepting a higher bid.
209. 479 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
210. Id. at 813. The court went on to emphasize that "to be qualified the MBE need not
offer the most outstanding contract in every regard. While the MBE must indeed be qualified,
it is sufficient if the work or goods offered are commercially reasonable and competitively
priced." Id. at 813 n.4.
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ance.21' Even less clear are the standards a defendant must meet to
rebut a plaintiff's case. The opinion merely requires defendants to show
that they "made reasonable and good faith efforts to meet the goal. "212
These essentially procedural standards presumably would require a prime
contractor at least to solicit bids from MBEs and to provide them the
information necessary to prepare a timely bid. If broadly interpreted,
the standards have the potential of inhibiting some ongoing discrim-
ination. They do nothing, however, to correct disadvantages produced
by earlier discrimination such as small size, inexperience, or inadequate
capital, that keep many, if not most, MBEs on the margins. The stan-
dards also leave protection against discrimination almost wholly to the
discretion of the trier of fact.
Two other state decisions involving firmer or mandatory set-asides
produced startling results. Both found evidence of intentional discrim-
ination against an MBE, and one awarded substantial damages.
In Khalifa v. State,213 a state appellate court reversed the trial court's
grant of a motion to dismiss and held that an MBE had made a prima
facie claim of discrimination in two ways. The MBE alleged that under
a state human rights act, the reversal by the state Commissioner of an
administrative decision by the state small business coordinator to set
aside a $1.2 million contract for minority firms had been impermissibly
racially motivated. The first prima facie case consisted of showings
that: (1) plaintiff was an MBE; (2) it sought and qualified for the con-
tract under the set-aside program; (3) it was denied the opportunity
for the contract under the set-aside program; and (4) the contract was
then given to a nonminority firm under competitive bidding proce-
dures. 2 4 The plaintiff also established an alternative prima facie case
by direct proof of impermissible racial motivation. 215 The contract was
withdrawn from the set-aside program after telephone calls from thirty
to forty nonminority firms urging this result.
The state attempted to rebut the plaintiff's case by showing that
the reversal was made as a precaution against letting a set-aside contract
go to a single bidder and that it followed an informal internal policy
requiring competitive bidding for all contracts of more than $1 million
in order to ensure the state a fair price. To prove these excuses were
211. From the perspective of an MBE contemplating a suit against a potential customer,
clear guidance would be critical. The one thing worse than suing a potential customer would
be suing one and losing.
212. Id. at 813.
213. 397 N.W.2d 383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). This decision also cryptically upheld a disparate
impact claim without indicating its statutory or constitutional basis. Id. at 388.
214. Id. at 387.
215. Id.
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pretexts, the plaintiff argued that the reversal by the Commissioner did
not follow standard operating procedure and that the procurement di-
vision's ability under established practices and regulations to estimate
a fair price adequately protected the state from an unfair price. No
subsequent opinions have been reported, but the following year the
plaintiff won the disputed contract in open competitive bidding.
21 6
The only decision imposing liability for business discrimination
after a trial on the merits is Brant Construction Co., Inc. v. Lumen
Construction, Inc. 217 The plaintiff, a Hispanic-owned firm, claimed
that once it had received a subcontract under a set-aside, the defendant
interfered with its performance in violation of the civil rights laws. The
trial court imposed liability on a prime contractor for quantum meruit
recovery as well as for violations of 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1983.211
It awarded $232,996.60 in damages, $155,132 in attorney's fees and
$20,258.57 in expenses and expert witness fees.
219
The appellate court sustained the trial court's finding of a section
1981 violation.m The appellate court determined that the defendant's
interference with the plaintiff's performance on the excavation project
and refusal to offer the assistance to MBEs required under the terms
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) funded set-aside pre-
vented Lumen from making and enforcing contracts.2 1 Lumen estab-
lished its section 19832m claim by showing that the project was built
on public land with public funds; that MBE participation was required
by the EPA; and that Brant's actions had deprived Lumen of the ben-
efits of the set-aside program.m The trial court also found intentional
discrimination because "Brant attempted to prevent Lumen from par-
ticipating in the project, . . . Brant wrongfully exercised control over
Lumen's finances, . . . Lumen's employees were intimidated into leav-
ing the job site and ... Brant failed to assist Lumen as required by
MBE regulations.' '
216. Id. at 391.
217. 515 N.E.2d 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
218. Id. at 871-73.
219. Id. at 877.
220. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
221. 515 N.E.2d at 873.
222. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or, other proper
proceeding for redress.
223. Brant, 515 N.E.2d at 873-74.
224. Id. at 874.
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These state court opinions offer genuine potential for creating le-
gal doctrines that realistically deal with discrimination in business trans-
actions. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's holding in Patterson v.
McClean Credit Union225 places the continuing viability of these state
court opinions in question. Patterson held that section 1981 coverage
does not extend beyond the formation stage of a contract. 6 This hold-
ing overrules Brant unless the holding in Brant can be predicated on
section 1983 alone, and assuming Patterson does not limit the scope
of section 1983. 221
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.? may also limit such fa-
vorable state court opinions. In Khalifa the result depended upon the
existence of a state set-aside similar to the one invalidated by Croson.2 9
Pervasive business discrimination can exist without leaving the kind of
hard evidence of its presence that Croson demands before state and
local set-asides are permitted. 20 Croson undermines even the good faith
plans that made the Technicable Video Systems v. Americable31 result
possible. The Supreme Court, in short, seems intent on aborting a
promising trend of recognizing the significance of race in the mar-
ketplace.
C. Private Rights of Action
Another group of litigants has directly attacked noncompliance
with MBE programs. Instead of using noncompliance as evidence of
the discrimination, they seek to compel effective implementation of
these programs. The question these litigants pose is, if a prime con-
tractor ignores the obligations imposed upon it by an MBE program,
can an MBE sue to remedy this violation, or does only the government
imposing the obligation have standing to sue.2 32 In Organization of
225. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
226. Id. at 2369-71.
227. See supra note 118.
228. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
229. The set-aside in Brant originated with the federal government. Brant, 515 N.E.2d at
870. Assuming the Supreme Court can trace its mandate to Congress rather than to a federal
agency, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 1997 (1990), would sustain its authorization
as long as that five to four decision survives. See supra note 6.
230. Legislation has been introduced (so far unseccessfully) to delegate to subordinate
governments Congress's greater power to enact set-asides. See Civil Rights Act of 1990, S.
2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
231. 479 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
232. Some district courts have held that a government's failure to impose sanctions for
violation of a contract's antidiscrimination provision is not state action for purposes of a §
1983 claim. See Cox v. Athena Cablevision, 558 F. Supp. 258, 259 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); Peterson
v. Lehigh Valley District Council, 453 F. Supp. 735, 738 (E.D. Pa. 1978), vacated on other
grounds, 676 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1982).
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Minority Vendors v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, 233 a trial court found
an implied private right of action under the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act,23 which provided federal funds to rebuild the
railroad infrastructure (as well as a contract cause of action under a
third party beneficiary theory).235 Despite the promising result in this
case, it is contrary to the prevailing trend.
During a period of activism in the 1960s, courts viewed certain
federal statutes expansively and granted litigants standing to sue for
.statutory violations even though the statute did not provide explicitly
for enforcement by private parties. 2 6 Then in the 1970s the Supreme
Court retreated .217 In Cort v. Ash,238 the Court announced several new
requirements to establish whether a private remedy was implicit in a
statute not expressly providing one. First, the plaintiff must be 'one
of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted." '239
Second, there must be an "indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one.' '" 2M Third, it
must be "consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff."' '41 Finally, the Court
asked whether "the cause of action [was] one traditionally relegated
to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on fed-
eral law." 'A-
Most federal MBE enactments would have a fairly easy time sat-
isfying all but the second requirement concerning legislative intent. In
Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp.,243 a recent securities decision finding
an implied right of action under section 13(e) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act, the Sixth Circuit applied the Cort analysis and elab-
orated on the required showing of explicit or implicit intent.244 It ruled
233. 579 F. Supp. 574, 588 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
234. 45 U.S.C. §§ 801-802 (1988).
235. Minority Vendors, 579 F. Supp. at 600-01.
236. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-34 (1964); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375, 382-83 (1970).
237. This did not affect implied private rights of action based upon state statutes.
238. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).




243. 826 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988). Some cases also
distinguish between "right creating" language and "duty creating" language. See, e.g., Univer-
sities Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 769 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-24 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560,
568-77 (1979); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 236-44 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 667, 683-717 (1979).
244. Howing, 826 F.2d at 1474-76.
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that the law prior to Cort presumed a private remedy if legislation was
silent on the issue, but that for subsequent enactments Congress could
indicate its intent to imply a private right of action by patterning a
statute on another statute for which a private action already had been
implied.2 45 The federal set-aside enactments, virtually all of which post-
date Cort, have not been so patterned.
Now that Croson has undermined the validity of all state and local
set-aside programs, those programs not repealed may face increased
indifference from the bureaucracies charged with their implementation.
Although Cort did not limit private rights of action premised on state
statutes or local ordinances, such actions become moot if the legislation
they seek to enforce is invalidated. At the federal level, while Metro
Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC2 sustained a federal minority preference,
federal set-asides have not been patterned on enactments for which
private rights of action previously had been implied. Private enforce-
ment of either federal or local MBE legislation is therefore unlikely
to be a viable alternative.
D. Eliminating the Intent Requirement
As a practical matter, the burden of proving intentional discrim-
ination has been insurmountable, and Congress is unlikely to amend
existing law to eliminate this onerous requirement. Since minorities
control a number of major urban jurisdictions and since City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co.247 recognized the power of local governments
to legislate against discrimination occurring within their borders, 24 the
Court practically invited local government to correct discrimination
with legislation. 249 Could these jurisdictions, whose set-asides have been
undermined by Croson, simply prohibit private business discrimination
with laws that do not require proof of intentional discrimination?250
245. Id. at 1475.
246. 110 S. Ct. 1947 (1990).
247. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
248. "[A] state or local subdivision (if delegated the authority from the State) has the
authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own legislative jurisdiction."
Id. at 491-92.
249. "States and their local subdivisions have many legislative weapons at their disposal
both to punish and prevent present discrimination." Id. at 494. "Where such discrimination
occurs, a city would be justified in penalizing the discriminator and providing relief to the
victim of such discrimination." Id. at 509.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 177-188 for an approach based upon disparate
impact theory.
[Vol. 421302 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN BUSINESS
This approach presents a number of problems. Primarily it would
intrude into the operations of private firms in unprecedented ways. To
create the factual basis for discrimination suits, such a law would have
to impose on private procurement transactions the same requirements
found in public procurement, chiefly public notice of bid opportunities
and an obligation to accept the lowest responsible bid. To avoid the
problems of proving intent created by T & S Service Associates, Inc.
v. Crenson,2' the law also would have to require the acceptance of a
low bid without regard to the capabilities of the bidder. Such a degree
of inflexibility would be economically wasteful and unmanageable and
probably would result in a wholesale relocation of business firms to
neighboring jurisdictions. In addition, subjecting the entire local busi-
ness economy to such pervasive regulation would require an enormous
bureaucracy to administer and enforce. The direct expense of operating
such a system would be compounded by the indirect costs arising from
the delays inherent in the bureaucratic process. Eliminating the intent
requirement, therefore, is simply not politically or economically fea-
sible.
Ill. Reconsidering Set-Asides
Does current doctrine leave MBEs without an effective remedy for
business discrimination? Since existing legislation provides no relief and
effective legislation cannot be created, MBEs have no choice but to
rely on set-asides if they are to be protected against discrimination.
2
The efficacy of set-asides in protecting MBEs from discrimination de-
pends on whether the local political leadership in jurisdictions where
discrimination occurs can and will make the findings necessary for a
business set-aside to survive strict scrutiny under Croson. Questions of
political will aside, given the difficulty in making adequate findings
required by Croson, even in circumstances of pervasive discrimination,
Croson's abhorrence of racial classifications in effect endorses and sup-
ports this discriminatory status quo. Legal doctrines that leave busi-
nesses victimized by discrimination without an effective remedy, when
all the victims are minorities and all the culprits are nonminorities, are
racially neutral only from the perspective of the culprits.
A. Findings of Discrimination
In theory at least, the Court could uphold a state or local set-aside
if the enacting jurisdiction showed a compelling governmental interest
251. 666 F.2d 722 (1st Cir. 1981); see supra text accompanying notes 125-152.
252. For a prophylactic approach relying on market incentives, see Suggs, Rethinking
Minority Business Development Strategies, supra note 4.
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supported by adequate findings of discrimination and tailored the set-
aside narrowly. "In the extreme case, some form of narrowly tailored
racial preference might be necessary to break down patterns of delib-
erate exclusion." 253 In practice, however, generating the necessary find-
ings to justify the set-aside may prove to be nearly impossible.
The Croson Court avoided articulating a definitive standard for
the required findings of discrimination, but it seemed to suggest that
such findings must satisfy the requirements for a constitutional or stat-
utory violation by at least someone .2 4 In a separate concurrence, how-
ever, Justice Kennedy did articulate a specific standard for findings of
discrimination and it is a forbidding one. He stated that: "evidence
which would support a judicial finding of intentional discrimination
may suffice also to justify remedial legislative action . . . . ",5 As has
been illustrated earlier in this Article, it is extremely difficult to show
intentional discrimination, the predicate for statutory or constitutional
violations, in a particular transaction.
256
Without readily obtainable data about individual instances of dis-
crimination, localities might rely on aggregate data to show discrim-
ination against minority businesses. Seeming to support this approach,
the Court has suggested that "'[w]here gross statistical disparities can
be shown, they alone in a proper case may constitute prima facie proof
of a pattern or practice of discrimination.' ' 12 7 Unfortunately, the Court
has a conceptually flawed view of statistical disparities. In its uncritical
application of statistical disparities in employment discrimination to
minority business utilization, 58 the Court made a serious error. With
253. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia argued that states
and subordinate governments should be permitted to act by race to undo the effect of past
discrimination, only when it is their own unlawful discrimination that is being remedied. Id. at
524 (Scalia, J., concurring). Further, he would permit only race neutral remedies for discrimi-
nation by prime contractors against minority subcontractors, however ineffective they might be.
Id. at 525-28.
254. "There is nothing approaching a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory
violation by anyone in the Richmond construction industry." Id. at 500 (citing Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
255. Id. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 125-160; see also Suggs, Rethinking Minority
Business Development Strategies, supra note 4, at 109-12.
257. Croson, 488 U.S. at 501 (quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
299, 307-08 (1977)).
258. In using statistical evidence to show employment discrimination, "where special quali-
fications are necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory
exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the task." Croson, 488 U.S.
at 501-02. The Croson court therefore rejected Richmond's showing of a disparity between
black population and MBE participation in Richmond's construction contracting, because the
city should have shown a disparity between participation and minority firms qualified to
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employment the employer usually does not control access to the rel-
evant labor pool. For instance, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Ed-
ucation,259 the defendant school board did not control the ability of
minority teachers to attend college and obtain teaching credentials. But
in the construction industry, prime contractors' decisions to exclude
minorities from participation in private construction directly thwart the
ability of these firms to qualify for inclusion in the relevant pool of
MBEs "qualified to undertake prime or subcontracting work in public
construction projects."2w Applying the Croson Court's analysis to con-
ditions in Richmond during the heyday of dejure segregation or slavery
demonstrates the flaw in the Court's reasoning. During that period
there were few, if any, qualified MBE construction firms and no par-
ticipation by MBEs in the City of Richmond's procurement of con-
struction services. Zero participation in Richmond's construction
procurement compared to zero MBE firms in the qualified pool is no
disparity at all, so there existed no statistical basis to find any dis-
crimination.
Some scholars have taken heart from the Croson Court's apparent
reliance on Ohio Contractors Association v. Keip.26' This suggests an
implied approval of the Sixth Circuit's findings of discrimination based
upon the use of statistical data. 262 The court of appeals in Ohio Con-
tractors found two statistical disparities to be convincing evidence of
discrimination against minority groups in the award of state con-
tracts.2 6Under closer analysis, however, neither of these two disparities
hold up.
The first disparity involved the number of minority firms partic-
ipating in state procurement compared to the number present in Ohio.26
During the period 1975-1977, minority firms comprised seven percent
of all Ohio businesses but received less than 0.5 percent of purchase
contracts from the state department of transportation. This disparity
no more supports an inference of intentional discrimination than does
a disparity between population and business participation. Since a dis-
proportionately large number of minority firms operate in the personal
participate. "Reliance on the disparity between the number of prime contracts awarded to
minority firms and the minority population of the city of Richmond is... misplaced." Id. at
501.
259. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
260. Croson, 488 U.S. at 502.
261. 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983).
262. See, e.g., Karst, Private Discrimination and Public Responsibility: Patterson in Context,
1989 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 1, 45.
263. Ohio Contractors, 713 F.2d at 171.
264. Id.
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service and small retail trade sectors of the economy, a dispropor-
tionately small number operate in industries from which state de-
partments of transportation purchase goods and services.2 65 If analysis
further refines the seven percent figure to exclude not only minority
firms in inappropriate industries but those that are too small (often
part-time moonlighting ventures)2 to serve as government suppliers,
the disparity becomes much smaller and might disappear.
The second disparity relied upon by the court in Ohio Contractors
came from a study revealing that only 0.24 percent of the dollar value
of general construction contracts went to minority firms. 267 Since mi-
nority firms made up seven percent of all Ohio firms, the disparity
approaches a magnitude of twenty-eight to one. Here, too, a simple
analysis and refinement of these data greatly reduces the disparity. The
court's comparison of minority firms to minority state construction
revenues assumes erroneously that minority firms are on average as
large as other firms, while in fact they are on average much smaller.
Nationally, black-owned firms constitute two percent of all firms but
garner only 0.16 percent of all business revenues.2 68 In addition, they
account for about forty percent of minority firms but generate only
about thirty percent of minority firm revenues.26 9 If we assume that
construction spending and prevalence of MBEs in Ohio are represen-
tative of the nation, then the expected participation of MBEs in state
contracting would be about 0.53 percent.270 This simple refinement re-
duces the disparity from the "gross" level of 28:1 to little more than
2:1. If the revenue disparity further were refined by industry, as with
the first disparity, it might disappear altogether.
The basic problem, however, is not the absence of shocking dis-
parities but that gross statistics at such an elementary level cannot dem-
onstrate intentional discrimination. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.,271 with its favorable citation of Ohio Contractors, created a trap
for the unwary. Croson's dictates cannot be satisfied simply by pulling
a few statistics from a handy census report; not given the hostility to-
wards affirmative action of much of the current federal judiciary.
272
265. See generally, R. SuGos, RECENT CHANGES, supra note 32.
266. Compared with whites, a substantially lower percentage of blacks are self-employed
year round. This suggests a greater reliance by blacks on self-employment as an income
supplement or as an alternative to periodic employment. Id. at 4 n.10.
267. Ohio Contractors, 713 F.2d at 171.
268. See R. SuGGs, RECENT CHNGS, supra note 32, at 6.
269. R. SuGcGs, MiNoRrrms AND PRIVATIZATION: EcoNoMIc MOBILITY AT RISK 522-53 (1989).
270. If the black share of Ohio's MBE business community is the same as the black national
share, and if the level of participation of MBEs in Ohio's construction spending were propor-
tional to the black share of national business receipts, then 0.1607o divided by 30% = 0.53%.
271. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
272. See Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 723 F. Supp. 669, 678 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
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Only the most thorough 27 and comprehensive studies274 can expect to
pass Croson's muster.
The problem is that standard aggregate data on minority business
and the effects of discrimination do not and cannot distinguish between
current discrimination and the continuing effects of prior discrimi-
nation (i.e., small size, inexperience, and undercapitalization). Such
data also fail to distinguish between the effects of "societal
discrimination" 275 and acts of business discrimination. Discriminatory
membership policies of private country clubs probably would not qual-
ify for the findings Croson requires, but such policies undoubtedly have
an impact on the ability of minority entrepreneurs to make the social
contacts that are a vital part of the business world. 276 New data would
have to be generated to reflect current racial realities.
The Court's treatment of societal discrimination in Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education2" and Croson and its discussion of the
requisite findings of discrimination in Croson serve notice that it will
require much more specific information than previously has been col-
lected.27 The Court also suggested that other government entities might
[A]fter reviewing the best evidence brought forward by the defendants .... the court
is at a loss to understand why there had been no stipulation for entry of a preliminary
injunction .... This Court is forced to question the good faith of Defendants in
opposing the efforts of Plaintiffs to suspend the MBE program of Hillsborough
County ....
Id. President Reagan's impact on the federal judiciary may well be his most lasting legacy:
By 1992, as many as three-quarters of the country's 752 federal trial and appeals
court judges will owe their jobs to Reagan or Bush....
* [The judges named by Reagan [are] far more likely than those selected by his
predecessor, Jimmy Carter, to reject claims of race or sex discrimination, rule against
criminal defendants and find that environmental, civil rights groups and others had
no standing to sue.
Reagan appointees, who faced an ideological screening process unprecedented in its
rigor, now control eight of the 13 appeals courts.
Kamen & Marcus, Liberal Judges May Become Endangered Species, BLACK Issuns iN Hiona
EDUCAT oN, February 16, 1989, at 8.
273. The City of Atlanta's current study in support of several minority business initiatives
runs to eight volumes and about 1100 pages and cost $517,650. Brimmer & Marshall,. Public
Policy and Promotion of Minority Economic Development (June 29, 1990).
274. The cost of such studies probably would exceed the resources of all but the largest
local government jurisdictions. The smaller the jurisdiction, the less recourse it has to standard
census data sets compiled for states, counties, major cities, and standard metropolitan statistical
areas. Creation of new data for such a jurisdiction would be extremely expensive.
275. Croson denied local governments the power to remedy "societal discrimination."
Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-91.
276. The United States Golf Association estimates that three of every four private golf clubs
in the country have membership restrictions of some kind. Sixteen of the 22 clubs hosting
upcoming major golf tournaments have no black members. Few Blacks in Clubs for Majors,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1990, at A18, col. 6.
277. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
278. In contrast to this treatment for states and localities, Congress may have an easier
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have to show more than Congress before undertaking race conscious
measures: "the degree of specificity required in the findings of dis-
crimination ... may vary with the nature and authority of a govern-
mental body." 79 Thus, smaller jurisdictions with fewer resources appear
to be at a disadvantage given the difficulty of making the requisite
showing and the more rigorous and expensive documentation required.
All in all, despite two recent court decisions refusing to invalidate local
set-asides on summary judgment motions,2 0 when states and localities
must do more than raise an issue of material fact, it will not be easy
for them to satisfy Croson's dictates2 11
B. The Justification of Set-Asides as a Preventive Measure: Recognition
of a Market Barrier
One remarkable feature of set-aside jurisprudence is its failure to
consider the existence or relevance of ongoing discrimination against
burden. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), Justice Powell pointed out in his
concurring opinion:
One appropriate source [for a record] is the information and expertise that Congress
acquires in the consideration and enactment of earlier legislation. After Congress has
legislated repeatedly in an area of national concern, its Members gain experience that
may reduce the need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congress again
considers action in that area.
Id. at 503 (Powell, J., concurring). Fullilove is still good law for federal set-asides, and this
more reasonable standard still might be availed of by Congress. It is questionable, however,
whether set-asides established by federal agencies without the clear imprimatur of Congress will
have recourse to this more lenient standard for the requisite findings of discrimination.
279. Id. at 515 n.14 (Powell, J., concurring). This language was quoted with approval by
the Court in Croson, 488 U.S. at 489.
Perhaps one way a city could gather evidence would be to analyze the experience of MBEs
that aggressively market themselves to the firms which are significant suppliers to the jurisdiction.
If the MBEs are discouraged from bidding or are treated in a manner that is not commercially
reasonable, this might be evidence of racial barriers to their ability to participate in city
subcontracting. This approach might not be useful more than one time. Once suppliers became
aware of what was occurring, they might adopt the procedures presently found in the housing
industry. Housing discrimination, although not losing its effectiveness, is hidden by a veneer of
superficial politeness and courtesy. Given the Court's view that the specificity of the required
findings increases at lower levels of government, it is unlikely that smaller jurisdictions could
bear the expense, even if data theoretically could be collected.
280. Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 729 F. Supp. 734 (W.D. Wash. 1989); Cone Corp.
v. Hillsborough County, 723 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Fla. 1989).
281. For post-Croson decisions invalidating state or local set-asides, see Harrison & Burrowes
Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 743 F. Supp. 977 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); Contractors Ass'n v.
City of Philadelphia, 735 F. Supp. 1274 (E.D. Penn. 1990); Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n
v. Fiedler, 731 F. Supp. 1395 (W.D. Wis. 1990); Main Line Paving Co. v. Board of Educ.,
725 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Penn. 1989); see also Michigan Road Builders Ass'n v. Milliken, 834
F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 1061 (1989) (invalidating Michigan's law setting aside
portion of business contracts for minority and women business enterprises).
1308 [Vol. 42
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN BUSINESS
minority businesses as a justification for set-asides.M It offends com-
mon sense to assume that business discrimination does not occur when
discrimination can be documented so easily in social and other eco-
nomic activities, but the Supreme Court apparently has adopted this
assumption.2 3 In Fuilove v. Klutznick,? the Court focused on the
continuing effects of historical discrimination u5 In all of the discussion
of prior discrimination only one of five opinions made even a passing
reference to the possibility that discrimination might continue to oc-
cur.28
6
In that opinion Justice Stevens recognized the relevance of racial
prejudice to business decisions.? Although he identified four possible
policy justifications for minority business set-asides,Us he overlooked
the relevance of continuing discrimination as an additional justifica-
tion. He could have added a fifth justification, that set-asides are a
preventive. Set-asides stymie discrimination that might otherwise occur
in the selection by government prime contractors of subcontractors.
They also compensate for the effects of discrimination in the private
sector which limit the ability of MBEs to gain the experience and ca-
pability to perform in the public sector. Rather than viewing set-asides
as an additional and unnecessary remedy, had the true extent of MBE
exposure to unremedial discrimination been recognized, the Court could
282. It is as if the absence of illegal discrimination has been defined as equal opportunity.
This legitimizes unconscious or covert discrimination that current doctrine, requiring stringent
proof of intent, permits to continue. See Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Trans-
formation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. Rstv. 1331 (1988);
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review
of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
283. Justice Blackmun has wondered "whether the majority still believes that race discrim-
ination-or, more accurately, race discrimination against non-whites-is a problem in our
society, or even remembers that it ever was." Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642, 662 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
284. 448 U.S. 448 (1990).
285. Id. at 458-63.
286. In that instance Justice Stevens wrote, "It is unfortunately but unquestionably true
that irrational racial prejudice persists today and continues to obstruct minority participation
in a variety of economic *pursuits, presumably including the construction industry." Id. at 544
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 539-40.
288. Four different ... justifications ... have been advanced: first, that the 10% set-
aside is a form of reparation for past injuries to the entire membership of the class;
second, that it is an appropriate remedy for past discrimination against minority
business enterprises that have been denied access to public contracts; third, that the
members of the favored class have a special entitlement to 'a piece of the action'
when government is distributing benefits; and fourth, that the program is an appro-
priate method of fostering greater minority participation in a competitive economy.
Id. at 536 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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have viewed set-asides as perhaps the only viable means of correcting
this discrimination.
C. Business Is Not Employment
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.289 epitomizes a style of ju-
dicial decisionmaking that divorces abstract principle from factual con-
text. 290 In extending to the business context principles developed to deal
with employment discrimination, the Court failed to recognize several
important distinctions.
The Court's focus on past discrimination to the exclusion of cur-
rent discrimination created the false impression that the beneficiaries
of business set-asides occupy a position analogous to the beneficiaries
of employment hiring goals. Such an analogy ignores a crucial dif-
ference. Statutes prohibit discrimination in public or private employ-
ment,291 but despite the many congressional acts banning racial and
gender discrimination in public accommodations, 292 employment, vot-
ing,293 and housing,294 none explicitly bars discrimination in business
transactions between two commercial entities. In the employment con-
text even when courts bar affirmative action goals, the ongoing dis-
crimination violates Title VII or section 1981 and victims can obtain
relief.2 95 The imposition of hiring goals merely extends the class af-
forded relief to individuals not previously identified as victims. But as
demonstrated earlier, victims of business discrimination have essentially
no chance of obtaining relief.
An implicit but important motivation for recourse to hiring goals
is that absent a numerical goal, a recalcitrant employer cannot be trusted
to stop discriminating.29 This aspect of affirmative action goals gains
an enhanced significance for business set-asides because the actual vic-
289. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
290. For an insightful literary analysis of the Scalia concurrence and Marshall dissent in
Croson, see Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 Tax. L. REv. 381 (1989).
291. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988); see 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
292. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1988).
293. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb, 1973aa-la, 1973aa-6 (1988).
294. Civil Rights Act of 1968 (The Fair Housing Act), Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-819, 82
Stat. 73, 81-89 (1968) (codified at scattered sections of titles 18, 25, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
295. I realize that a suit to benefit a single claimant may not be cost effective.
296. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (Alabama Department of
Public Safety repeatedly failed to comply with court orders addressing the Department's
discriminatory promotion practices; court upheld a one black for one white promotion require-
ment); Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (Local
28 continued to discriminate against nonwhites in violation of court order; court upheld a 29%
nonwhite membership goal as appropriate).
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tims of discrimination by local government prime contractors have no
remedy beyond the prophylactic impact of a procurement set-aside.
297
Another difference that makes inapposite the analogy of em-
ployment to business is that a hiring goal theoretically accomplishes
its objective by fiat. Since courts base employment goals on the avail-
ability of minorities in the labor market and employers usually do not
control access by minorities to the relevant labor pool, so long as the
court sets the goal appropriately, the employer usually can achieve the
required proportion of minority hires. Individual employees generally
do not depend for their continued existence on sources of income apart
from their employment. On the other hand, few business firms, mi-
nority or otherwise, rely wholly on a single government customer. Any
procurement goal exceeding the e.xisting very small MBE market share
depends in part on the erosion of racial barriers to private commercial
transactions. Otherwise, the increased MBE capacity achieved by the
set-aside may be unable to be maintained permanently because the same
prime contractors that discriminate in public procurement subcon-
tracting also, through their subcontracting in the private sector, control
access by minorities to the contracts necessary for their long term sur-
vival and growth. Complete relief requires something more than ju-
dicial or legislative fiat affecting only the public sector. There must be
a corresponding change in private behavior in the marketplace.
Stigmatization has often been cited as a consequence of racial clas-
sification, providing the basis for some opposition to their use.29 1 By
treating set-asides as just another variety of affirmative action this ar-
gument has been extended to them. 299 Whatever the dubious historical
merits of this argument,3°° it ignores the fact that many larger minority
firms employ nonminorities in a wide variety of roles.30' Since cus-
tomers of MBEs might find themselves dealing with nonminority em-
ployees, their opinion of the firm will depend upon the performance
of these employees. Does the Court fear that stigmatization will extend
297. For an alternative approach designed to prevent discrimination by prime contractors in
the procurement of local governments which are supportive of minority business development
initiatives, see Suggs, Rethinking Minority Business Development Strategies, supra note 4.
Unfortunately, this approach would not work in jurisdictions indifferent or hostile to minority
business development.
298. Steele, A Negative Vote on Affirmative Action, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1990, (Magazine)
at 46, 48, 53.
299. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94.
300. This argument fails to account for the long history of stigmatization antedating by
centuries the advent of affirmative action in the late 1960s. It assumes that the broadly held
notions of racial inferiority disappeared with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
then revived only with the appearance of affirmative action in the late 1960s.
301. For purposes of set-aside eligibility, the definition of an MBE considers only a firm's
ownership and control. The racial make-up of its employees is immaterial.
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to these nonminority employees as well or that a firm can be stig-
matized as an abstract legal entity independent of its employees?
Another key distinction the Court ignored is that procurement set-
asides burden nonminorities less than do employment goals. Set-asides
allocate a percentage from a pool of contracts but do not require that
the same contracts be set aside from the pool each year. Thus, each
year the set-aside affects a different group of nonminority firms. More-
over, employment tends to be for longer periods than most commercial
contracts, so the burden of a business set-aside is for a shorter du-
ration. A typical job represents all the income earned by an employee,
but most business firms have revenues from many different contracts.
As a result a set-aside burden is of lesser consequence for a business
than for an employee.
Further mitigating the burden of set-asides is that an MBE can
be forty-nine percent owned by nonminorities, can have nonminority
employees, can subcontract with non-MBEs, and can buy goods and
services from non-MBEs. The burden is further diffused because mi-
norities share it. Many nonminority companies have minority em-
ployees, and if they are public companies, some of the beneficial owners
of their shares will be minorities, largely through the medium of state
and local government pension funds.
These distinctions may be insufficient to sway the Croson Court,
but the absence of any discussion of these factors suggests how far the
Court has divorced itself from the realities that MBEs must confront.
D. Racial Neutrality
The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny analysis to the legis-
lative racial classification used by the Richmond City Council in Cro-
son because "there is simply no way of determining what classifications
are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated
by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics."3 °2
The Court never identified what makes racial politics so abhorrent,
unless it is to be understood from a later reference to racial classifi-
302. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). If the Court is
concerned with stigmatization of the firm or its employees, a distinction should be made between
the employment and business contexts. A minority employee hired because of a race-specific
remedy will of course be a minority, but the employees of an MBE may be of any ethnicity.
Thus, it is entirely possible for reluctant nonminority customers to find themselves dealing with
nonminority employees of the MBE. Since the performance of the nonminority employee will
be the basis for any assessment of the MBE made by the customer, at least in this circumstance,
a concern regarding stigmatization is misplaced.
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cations that racial politics leads to racial hostility.3 3 If that is what the
Court meant, then it ignores several centuries of American history.
Racial hostility and animus towards blacks existed long before blacks
could generally vote or engage in other meaningful political activity.
304
The Court is confusing cause with effect.
The Supreme Court utterly fails to realize that its purportedly race
neutral decisions can have a racially corrosive effect. It poses the choice
as one between a color-blind society and one in which the government
impedes this goal through use of racial classifications. It poses a false
dichotomy. The real choice is between greater use of racial classifi-
cations to promote equity and an adherence to a formal racial neu-
trality that permits greater levels and wider forms of discrimination to
go unremedied. From the minority perspective, the refusal of a gov-
ernment dominated by whites to penalize discrimination, whether by
omission or exemption, is a race-conscious decision. Government use
of racial classifications for discriminatory purposes did not create the
race consciousness of our society. Government use was merely one facet
of a pervasive racism that infected American society from its inception.
The real danger lies in the failure of the Court to realize that re-
quiring minorities to accept wider forms and higher levels of private
discrimination corrodes faith in the values proclaimed as fundamental.
A minority person whose children attend underfunded and inadequate
de facto segregated schools and who lives in a segregated neighborhood
receiving less than its share of public services does not feel that society
is race neutral because this segregation is imposed by private actors
without the use of governmental classifications. Whatever the sources
of discrimination, public or private, the experience of discrimination
itself, when left unremedied by a legal system, creates cynicism and
hostility and ultimately undermines the legitimacy of the legal system
that excuses it.
303. Id. at 493.
304. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 70, 73-74, 81-82 (1917) (rejecting a claim by
the City of Louisville that an ordinance which fostered segregated housing-preventing blacks
from living on streets where a majority of whites lived, and vice versa-was needed to prevent
racial conflict and possible breaches of the peace); see also Watson v. City of Memphis, 373
U.S. 526, 535 (1963) ("constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to
their assertion or exercise"); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958) (Little Rock, Ark. officials
attempt to avoid school desegregation order; Court held "law and order are not ... to be
preserved by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional rights"). But cf., Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (Court upheld the closing of segregated public swimming pools,
to avoid desegregation, in order to preserve law and order). This decision has been severely
criticized by commentators. Brest, Palmer v. Thompson, An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. Ray. 95; L. TRmE, AimICAN CONsTrru-
ToINAL LAw § 16-16 at 1480-82 (2d ed. 1988).
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IV. The American Experience of Japanese Nontariff Trade
Barriers
In the modern era few societies, if any, have freed themselves en-
tirely of the problem of the "color line."3 5 Social relationships, the
sphere in which we customarily look for the influence of discrimi-
nation, do not exist separate and independent of economic relation-
ships. One would expect, therefore, that the pernicious influence of
race would extend to all facets of American life, including business
transactions, and that its influence would not be unique to American
society. In the business community race produces a domestic nontariff
trade barrier3°6 between the minority and nonminority business com-
munities.
Another such nontariff trade barrier, one which allegedly denies
American firms access to Japanese markets, is currently the subject of
extensive debate within our national policy-making apparatus. That
debate has at least two parallels to the minority set-aside debate. The
first, echoing the Supreme Court's skepticism in Croson about whether
intentional discrimination still occurs, questions whether a trade barrier
truly exists and whether discriminatory conduct by the Japanese really
occurs. The second mirrors the controversy that divided the Croson
Court. That controversy concerns whether antidiscrimination legisla-
tion can effectively remove trade barriers or whether real redress re-
quires some sort of mandated market share. That part of the trade
debate, between "revisionists" and "free traders," asks whether Jap-
anese markets can best be opened to American firms by concentrating
on the removal of formal governmental and structural trade impedi-
ments,ec as the free traders argue, or only by a system of "managed
trade" in which Japan makes firm commitments to assure a specified
share of its markets to American firms.
From the perspective of the revisionists,
Japan is run by "Japan Inc.," a partnership of giant export-minded
enterprises and Government bureaucrats that defends producers against
305. "The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line, - the relation
of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the
sea." W.E.B. DuBois, TiH SouLs oF BLAcK FoLK 23 (1973).
306. Unlike a tariff, this barrier does not result from explicit government regulations imposing
a duty based on the value or other attributes of the product affected.
307. Governmental trade impediments include tariffs and regulations, typically with extra-
neous purposes like health and safety, that effectively exclude technically nonconforming foreign
products which meet substantially equivalent regulations in their home markets. Structural
impediments include distribution systems that rely on longstanding personal relationships and
cartel behavior that is endemic because of a lack of strong antitrust legislation and enforcement.
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the interests of consumers and guarantees that foreigners will never
get an even break.
From this perspective, it makes little sense to fight to lower the
formal barriers that block imports at the dock. Japan's bureaucratic-
industrial complex will always manage to undermine the spirit of open
commerce. The only international agreements likely to make a dif-
ference are the ones that manage trade, assuring American semicon-
ductor manufacturers a given percentage of the Japanese market, or
limiting exports of Japanese cars to so many million a year. °0
Increasingly, the American position of "managed trade" has gained
adherents. One proponent, Rudiger Dornbush, proposed "an arrange-
ment under which the Japanese would agree to raise imports of man-
ufacturers by 15 percent a year over 10 years."31 9 The policy of managed
trade is reflected more explicitly in a confidential side letter3 10 to the
third Japan-United States agreement on semiconductors. 31 "In this
side letter the Japanese said that they understood, welcomed, and would
make efforts to assist the United States companies in reaching their
goal of a 20-percent market share within five years. 312 Managed trade
by any other name is a set-aside in favor of American firms. 313
A. Identifying Discrimination
As with the claims of minority firms presented in Croson to justify
Richmond's set-aside, 31 4 American firms have great difficulty identi-
fying specific instances of discrimination. The barriers American firms
encounter, though subtle and elusive, nonetheless effectively undermine
their ability to gain reciprocal access 5 to Japanese markets.31 6 Al-
308. Passell, Does Japan Play Fair, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1990, at D2, col 1.
309. Dornbush, Revisionist Influence Seen in Japan Talks, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1989, at
D2, col. 5.
310. C. Pansowrrz, TRmmD, PLAcEs 65 (1988).
311. OrmcE oF THE U.S. T.ADE REPmRSENTATrVE, Arrangement between the Government of
Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Trade (Sept. 1986).
312. C. PnsTowrrz, supra note 310.
313. Despite the hyperbole that terms all set-asides as "quotas," most are of a softer, best
efforts variety, since virtually all contain a waiver provision. The crux is reached when the
leniency of the waiver-granting process is examined. Generally, grant of a waiver by a jurisdiction
responsive to a minority constituency occurs more rarely than in other jurisdictions. The analogy
drawn here between "managed trade" and a set-aside is most apt when the minority set-aside
is one in a jurisdiction without a strong minority constituency. This is the situation with respect
to many federal set-asides imposed on subordinate jurisdictions as a condition of receiving
federal funds.
314. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1989).
315. Like the barrier that minority firms confront, the Japanese barrier operates in only
one direction; minority markets remain open to majority firms and American markets remain
open to Japanese firms.
316. "The policy dialogue between the two countries is now turning to trade impediments
that arise from cultural, historical, and structural differences. These are much harder to negotiate
than tariff levels or quotas." Spencer, supra note 15, at 154-55.
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though the Japanese distribution network has been blamed for the dif-
ficulty faced by American firms, 317 few specific discriminatory acts by
private Japanese firms have been shown.318 Similar complaints are heard
about the nebulous barriers confronted by minority firms in domestic
markets. 319 The absence of minority firms often is blamed on their small
number, lack of effort, or perceived poor quality. Similarly, the lack
of success of American firms in Japan often is blamed on their short-
sighted unwillingness to establish a long-term market presence, 320 their
failure to understand or adapt to Japanese culture, or the poor quality
of their services and products. 321 One commentator sums up the Jap-
anese view as looking "at the United States as a country that has grown
soft and complacent, that has lost its competitive industrial edge, and
that is calling for protection from the pressures of the international
marketplace because it is unwilling to deal with its own shortcom-
ings.'' 322 Alternative explanations also cite the American firms that have
gained a presence in Japanese markets and blame the "absurdly high
price-earnings multiples" as the only formidable barriers to foreign
ownership .321
317. "From the Japanese side, structural changes in the Japanese distribution system and
reform of exclusionary business practices and relationships-the American requests-do involve
measures the Japanese government wishes to take." Id. at 158.
"I must admit that the distribution system is one of Japan's biggest headaches today." Morita
& Ishihara, supra note 15, at E3795.
318. The U.S. companies had well over half the [semiconductor] market outside Japan,
but only about 10 percent within it. The problem [of increasing U.S. sales to a
significant share of the Japanese market] was much more subtle than tariffs and
other formal trade barriers, which had largely been removed. It arose from several
factors: the tight ties between Japan's manufacturers and their suppliers and distrib-
utors, which entail social obligations that go far beyond contractual dealings ....
In effect, like disadvantaged U.S. minorities, we wanted an affirmative-action program
that would offset the effects of past discrimination by actively working to increase
imported chips.
C. PRESTowTrz, supra note 310, at 50-51.
A separate issue is the existence of tariff and other formal trade barriers involving governmental
regulations and approvals. These are constantly a source of friction between the American and
Japanese governments.
319. "[A] number of factors, difficult to isolate or quantify, seemed to impair access by
minority businesses to public contracting opportunities." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
461 (1980).
320. In explaining why so few American cars are sold in Japan, the founder and chairman
of the Sony Corporation wrote, "They make no effort at all to sell their cars in Japan, and
then call Japan unfair because Japan sells too much in the U.S. and that Japan will not buy
their products." Morita & Ishihara, supra note 15, at E3789.
321. Address by Rep. Toby Roth, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and Int'l
Studies, reprinted in 131 CONG. REc. 4035-36 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1985).
322. Spencer, supra note 15, at 154.
323. Passell, supra note 308.
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In the context of international trade the significance of trade bar-
riers lies in their impact upon the economic health and development
of the affected nations. While individual firms voice their particular
claims, the national government acts not to make individual firms whole,
but to safeguard the national economic well-being. No one calls for
victim-specific relief324 The policy justification for enactment of a set-
aside rests on the same basis: the cumulative toll individual instances
of exclusion exact on the economic health of MBEs collectively and
of minority communities. Jurisdictions enact set-asides not to redress
individual instances of discrimination against particular firms, but to
breach the trade barrier that excludes minority firms from the larger
business community.
In Croson the Supreme Court, in responding to the obvious his-
torical existence of a trade barrier hindering MBEs, recast this pro-
phylactic policy into a remedial one. It required the identification of
particular acts of discrimination of significant number and pervasive-
ness before a minority business set-aside could be enacted by a local
government. 325 In adopting this approach, the Court professed to safe-
guard against the possibility of earlier wrongs being used to justify
intervention long past the time when correction would be warranted. 326
The Court was also motivated by the concern that the careless or
unnecessary use by government of racial classifications might be viewed
as a statement that minorities are racially inferior because without the
set-aside mandate they could not compete. 27 The Court's preoccu-
pation with remedy led it to assume that current acts of racial dis-
crimination in commercial transactions could in fact be identified with
sufficient specificity.328 This assumption was utterly unwarranted. In
neither international nor domestic trade can such instances be so iden-
tified. If they could, American multinational corporations, with al the
324. See infra text accompanying notes 337-38.
325. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989). It also requires that the
set-aside be the most narrowly tailored means to remedy the identified discrimination. Id. at
506.
326. In the school cases, the States were required by court order to redress the wrongs
worked by specific instances of racial discrimination. That goal was far more focused
than the remedying of the effects of 'societal discrimination,' an amorphous concept
of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past.
University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
327. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94. Since this "statement of inferiority" would have been
promulgated by a minority-dominated city council, the Court would view this as a concession.
A less likely reading would have the Richmond City Council branding as inferior the nonminority
owned contractors that historically supplied 99% of its needs and that under the set-aside still
supplied 70%.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 156-160 for an explanation of the impracticability
of identifying specific acts of business discrimination in private commercial transactions.
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resources at their disposal, certainly could show individual instances
of exclusion from Japanese markets, and our trade problems with Ja-
pan long since would have been resolved. The Croson principles rel-
egate the victims of business discrimination, whether American
multinationals or MBEs, to the cold comfort of an historically inef-
fectual remedy of antidiscrimination legislation or treaties.
B. Croson and Trade Policy
The comparison of an international trade barrier between two sov-
ereign nations to a racial or ethnic barrier existing within the internal
domestic market of the United States has at least one important dis-
similarity. If the Japanese government enacted legislation setting aside
twenty percent of a particular Japanese market for American firms,3 29
this act could not implicate the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution. Yet if allocating economic resources based on race330
exacerbates stereotyping and racial politics, these harms occur regard-
less of the presence of international borders, so long as there exists a
legacy of racial stereotyping and hostility."'
"Constant Japan bashing in the United States has created a dan-
gerous reaction in Japan: bitter, resentful, nationalistic America bash-
ing. Japanese bookstores are currently offering more than 10 books
that claim to prove America's 'evil design' to destroy and eliminate
the Japanese challenge. '332 "Americans now answer in various polls
that the 'Japanese threat' is more dangerous to the United States than
the 'Soviet threat.' 33 American advertisers try to undermine the ap-
peal of Japanese products through commercials that feature ominous
references to Japanese militarism or veiled but disparaging comments
on Japanese society.
334
329. See supra notes 310-312 and accompanying text.
330. While technically "managed trade" would allocate trade based on nationality, at least
with respect to Japan-U.S. relations the correlation of nationality with race is very strong. Even
if there were no correlation, the history of the Third Reich demonstrates that nationalism can
be as pernicious and invidious as racism, if the two are even distinguishable, since both are
social constructs rather than scientific terms.
331. Increasing racial hostility also will create domestic repercussions. Asian Americans have
already been the targets of racist violence spawned by the trade deficit with Japan. Oan &
WINANT, RACIAL FORMAATION IN THE UNITED STATES 198 N.9 (1986).
332. Ito, supra note 15, at 133.
333. Id. at 132. For a poll with somewhat broader scope see Oreskes, Americans Voice
Worry on Japan, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1990, at A7, col 1.
334. See Rothenberg, Ads that Bash the Japanese: Just Jokes or Veiled Racism?, N.Y.
Times, July 11, 1990, at Al, col. 3; McDowell, After the Cold War, The Land of the Rising
Threat, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1990, at C13, col. 1 ("Even as the cold war fades into history,
American authors and publishers are discovering a new enemy: Japan.").
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Given this state of relations between the United States and Japan,
if our society pays more than lip service to the Croson policies con-
cerned with stereotyping, notions of inferiority, and the politics of ra-
cial hostility, then these same policies must play a major role in the
international trade arena as well. Refusing to apply the Croson policies
because the equal protection clause legally does not apply elevates form
over substance. If the Croson policies only control when trade barriers
victimize minority firms and not when they bar the major nonminority
firms, then the charge of hypocrisy can fairly be laid.3
35
If United States policymakers see the sheer magnitude of our trade
with Japan as justifying this hypocrisy because the economic stakes
loom too large to adhere to principled policies, then the hypocrisy is
greater than it first appears. As a response to trade barriers, a set-aside
for American firms in Japanese markets has less justification than one
for minority firms in domestic markets. Japan is only one market of
many, leaving markets representing about ninety percent of the world's
economic output open to American goods and services. 3 6 Minority firms
excluded from majority markets in the United States, however, have
only their own minority markets, which account for less than one per-
cent of the total.3 7 Small and undercapitalized, they cannot leapfrog
domestic markets to international ones. By force of circumstance, the
rest of the world is denied to them. On a relative scale the true cost
to the minority community of the Croson policies far exceeds the costs
imposed on American firms by Japanese barriers. Somehow, lesser bar-
riers hindering major American firms justify "managed trade," while
more onerous barriers imposed on weaker firms and a poorer com-
munity must be accepted in the name of principle.
The irony should not be overlooked that under Croson, minority
firms confronted with race-neutral barriers that exclude them because
of their small size or inexperience (factors often resulting from a legacy
of discrimination) can look only to race-neutral remedies. When the
majority's ox is being gored, on the other hand, nationality/race-spe-
cific remedies are proposed by American firms in the international arena
even though Japanese firms and society have utterly no responsibility
for the relatively lower price/earnings multiples of American firms, the
quality problems, or other race-neutral factors that exclude American
firms from their markets.
335. I recognize that these inconsistent policies emanate from different branches of govern-
ment. Trade policy is the province of the executive branch, and the courts establish the
constitutional limits of race conscious policies.
336. If barriers exist in the rest of the world's markets, the Japanese bear no responsibility
for them.
337. R. SUMS, MINORTs AND PRIVATIZATION, supra note 269, at 53.
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A second irony is that those who complain about Japanese dis-
criminatory barriers and advocate managed trade do not argue solely
for victim-specific relief. Yet as conservatives interpret the equal pro-
tection doctrine, and under Croson, managed trade-reserving market
shares for American firms-is not a race-neutral remedy, and thus must
be victim-specific. This failure to be victim-specific is especially glaring
because there is no indication that Japanese barriers are directed only
at American firms. Managed trade would guarantee American firms
access to markets that might otherwise be won by firms from other
nations. While the United States may have the political clout vis-a-vis
Japan to attempt to compel a system of managed trade, other nations
do not. In the context of Croson, it would be as if discrimination con-
cededly were directed at firms from all minority groups, but the set-
aside granted relief only to one.
One could attempt to distinguish the two situations by arguing that
United States minorities can lobby for legislation to prohibit
discrimination338 while American firms confront the government of a
sovereign nation. This basis for distinction does not withstand analysis.
Attempts to enact domestic antidiscrimination legislation require the
cooperation of the white majority responsible for exclusionary barriers,
just as treaties would depend on the agreement and acquiescence of
the Japanese. Even the potential for coalitions is similar. While mi-
norities often find nonminority allies, some Japanese interests would
potentially ally themselves with Americans to open their markets to
benefit Japanese consumers.3 9 Neither white America nor Japan is
monolithic in its attitudes or policies.
At bottom the problem may be that private Japanese firms just
refuse to deal with American firms on equal terms.314 If the Japanese
government, in a desperate and sincere effort to open its private mar-
kets, enacted a set-aside and signed a treaty guaranteeing American
firms a specified portion of a certain market,34' such action would run
afoul of the Croson rationale since intentional discrimination has yet
to be sufficiently identified. Croson would force American firms to
continue to rely on nonexistent or ineffectual antidiscrimination leg-
islation or wait for the gradual amelioration produced by neutral mar-
ket opening measures adopted to dismantle the Japanese network that
also excludes many Japanese firms. 342 Despite the best efforts of the
338. Of course such legislation would be grossly ineffective. See supra Part II.A.
339. Spencer, supra note 15.
340. Minority subcontractors have the same complaint about prime contractors.
341. See supra note 309-312.
342. "It is those ironclad, intragroup deals that Americans claim are Japan's biggest
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Japanese government to remove legal and other formal barriers and
to persuade Japanese firms to change their behavior, must American
firms accept continued exclusion?341 Croson would dictate such a result.
Conclusion
The Court's rationale in Croson was fundamentally flawed. It as-
sumed that MBEs had redress for acts of business discrimination or
that such remedies could be enacted. No effective remedy presently
exists, nor, given the realities of the business world, can one be con-
structed. The net result of Croson leaves state and local governments
unable to compel their own prime contractors to dismantle the market
barriers that minority firms encounter. While an alternative proposal344
would permit cooperating jurisdictions to reward firms that dismantle
the barriers MBEs confront, this measure relies on market incentives
to overcome barriers. The lack of competition 345 in some markets may
enable some recalcitrant contractors to ignore or actively resist the well-
intentioned efforts of some jurisdictions to open up their procurement.
Other jurisdictions, probably the majority, show no real interest in
eroding these market barriers. Unless minorities exercise significant po-
litical influence, their purchasing staffs view efficient procurement as
an objective difficult enough to achieve without adding antidiscrimi-
nation goals.
At a more basic level, the Supreme Court's obsession with formal
equality both blinds it to the concrete factual reality in which its ab-
stractions operate and allows it to tolerate grievous inequality. Its focus
and preoccupation in Croson with "quotas" allowed it blithely to as-
sume that "[s]tates and local subdivisions have many legislative weap-
ons at their disposal both to punish and prevent present discrimination
... ,"3 It made this assumption in the complete absence of any rec-
remaining trade barrier. Such arrangements also exclude many Japanese companies ......
Sanger, Rousing a Sleeping Industrial Giant, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1990, §3, at 1, col. 5.
343. "Mrs. [Carla] Hills [the U.S. trade representative] said that she had 'a bunch of
affidavits on my desk' from American companies complaining that price-fiing, group boycotts
and market allocation agreements were 'keeping them out of the Japanese market."' Farnsworth,
Progress in Talks with Japan, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1990, at D17, col 2.
"Japanese general contractors have been maintaining prices as much as 40% higher in
comparison to foreign bidders, due to bid rigging traditions to assure a monopoly on business
for themselves." Morita & Ishihara, supra note 15, at E3795.
344. See Suggs, Rethinking Minority Business Development Strategies, supra note 4, at 114-
23.
345. The lack of competition may in part result from the long suppression of minority
business activity.
346. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989).
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ord of an MBE ever having sued successfully on a claim of business
discrimination. 47 The result of this adherence to formal abstractions
leaves minority entrepreneurs defenseless against discriminatory ac-
tions. Much like Dred Scott,3 48 they have no rights that need be re-
spected.
The Court reached this result out of its concern that
"[c]lassifications based on race ... may in fact promote notions of
racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility."3 49 The Court
failed to consider that continued economic subordination350 of minor-
ities and wrongs left unremedied can generate racial hostilities on their
own.
The real test of the policies the Court used to justify its doctrine
will come in the international trade arena. There the roles have been
reversed. White Americans, once dominant, now find themselves with
their confidence undermined, their personal insecurities awakened, their
reputations sullied by negative stereotypes, and a subjective certainty
that they are being discriminatorily excluded from Japanese markets.
Will American trade policy adhere to the principles of free trade, or
will it seek recourse to "managed trade"?
If the latter, then the politics of racial hostility we risk engendering
pose a far more serious risk. We risk conflict with the world's most
dynamic and second largest economy, conflict with a nation whose
culture incorporates a militarism and racism as deep as our own, 35' and
conflict pitting former adversaries from the last World War.
Despite these risks, when the nation's perceived economic well-be-
ing seems deliberately undermined by unfair trade practices, the appeal
of "managed trade" as a practical solution may prove irresistible. If
347. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion
concluded erroneously that Title VI applied to federal procurement, and that "[in view of the
scarcity of litigated claims on behalf of minority business enterprises during this period, and
the lack of any contrary evidence in the legislative record, it is appropriate to presume that the
law has generally been obeyed." Id. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
348. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)'393 (1857).
349. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
350. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (statistics on discrimination).
351. American recollections of World War II and Japanese concern over protectionism,
resource embargoes, dependency on food imports, and resentment from other countries
about Japanese trading and investment practices will continue to cloud the relationship.
In addition, both countries have an unfortunate history of racism that could make
management of the relationship even more difficult than it is already. In Japan, for
example, this racism is visible in displays of arrogance about what are perceived to
be superior Japanese ways. In the United States racism is suggested by the double
standard sometimes applied to Japanese investments in the United States as compared
to West European investments.
Spencer, supra note 15, at 169.
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whites reject Croson's principles rather than accept the subordinate
position adherence to them may produce, then to insist, as Croson
does, that minority firms accept racial barriers that relegate them to
inferior status in the domestic economy is blatantly hypocritical.

